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Abstract 
Globalisation has been integrating markets across the world. The Multinational 
Enterprises (MNEs) look at the global market and they decide to invest in those 
countries that present the best conditions to increase their profits. MNEs' Investments 
have been associated with a stronger social and economic development in the receiving 
countries, and for that reason governments formulate policies to increase local 
attractiveness. But besides the advantages of receiving foreign investments, 
Governments are also keen to help local Enterprises to invest and expand in foreign 
markets. Giving such support, they look for benefits from profits and knowledge 
through reverse spillovers and political interests of home country. Outward Foreign 
Direct Investment is seen as an opportunity, and many Governments aim to increase 
their interventionism in supporting local companies’ internationalisation. 
Previous studies have identified several determinants that influence Outward Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) intensity. Economic dimensions, historical and cultural links, 
and geographic distance between home and host countries are among the most 
commonly used. Some government policies are also important for MNEs' investment 
decisions such as tax policy, investment treaties and openness to foreign investment. 
Besides that, it was found that political stability has a positive impact on investor’s 
decision, as it reduces risk. However, the existing literature has somehow overlooked 
the impact that governments' political orientation may have on Outward FDI. The 
political orientation of governments may interfere with the decisions of Multinationals 
concerning Outward Foreign Direct Investment, because the right wing parties and the 
left wing parties have different policies approaches.  Apart Schneider and Frey (1985) 
and to the best of our knowledge there are no other studies about this subject. Focusing 
on the Portuguese case, the main objective of this Dissertation is to scrutinize if the 
Outward FDI can be influenced by Government political orientations, in terms of 
quantity and geography. 
The study considers a sample of 13 countries for the period between 1996 and 2013, 
and uses a gravity equation for the Portuguese outward FDI and a panel data analysis. 
Specific variables are added to test the impact of governments' political orientation. The 
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results show that Portuguese Outward FDI is influenced by market dimension, 
language, political risk, Portuguese Government ideology and also by specific relations 
with Brazil, Netherlands and Spain. This research provides the first evidence that, in the 
studied period, right wing governments had a positive impact on Portuguese outward 
FDI. Yet, in contrast with other studies, political risk has a positive impact on Outward 
FDI, which may be explained by the particular Portuguese relations with Angola and 
Brazil.   
 
Keywords: Outward Foreign Direct Investment, Political economy, Political 
orientations, Portugal. 
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Resumo 
A globalização tem proporcionado a integração dos mercados a nível mundial. As 
empresas Multinacionais analisam o mercado global e tomam decisões de investimento 
em países que apresentam as melhores condições para o aumento dos seus lucros. Os 
seus investimentos têm sido associados a um desenvolvimento social e económico mais 
forte nos países de acolhimento e, por essa razão, os governos formulam políticas que 
visam atrair o investimento. Para além das vantagens de obter investimento estrangeiro, 
os governos têm também interesse em ajudar as empresas locais a investirem e 
expandirem em mercados estrangeiros. Facultando esse apoio, obtêm benefícios, dos 
lucros e do conhecimento através de externalidades (spillovers) internacionais e 
interesses políticos no país de origem. O Investimento Direto Estrangeiro no Exterior é 
visto como uma oportunidade, e muitos governos têm como objetivo aumentar o seu 
intervencionismo no apoio à internacionalização das empresas locais. 
Estudos anteriores identificaram vários determinantes que influenciam a intensidade do 
Investimento Direto Estrangeiro no Exterior. Dimensões económicas, laços históricos e 
culturais, e distância geográfica entre o País emissor e recetor estão entre os mais 
utilizados. Algumas políticas governamentais também são importantes para as decisões 
de investimento das Multinacionais, como a política fiscal, os tratados bilaterais para o 
investimento e a abertura ao investimento estrangeiro. Além disso, verificou-se que a 
estabilidade política tem um impacto positivo na decisão do investidor, uma vez que 
reduz o seu risco. No entanto, a literatura existente de alguma forma negligencia o 
impacto que a orientação política dos governos pode ter sobre Investimento Direto 
Estrangeiro. A orientação política dos governos podem interferir com as decisões das 
Multinacionais em matéria de investimento direto no estrangeiro, porque os partidos de 
direita e os de esquerda têm diferentes abordagens políticas. Para além de Schneider e 
Frey (1985), e considerando o melhor do nosso conhecimento, cremos que não existam 
outros estudos sobre o tema. Centrando-se no caso Português, o objetivo principal desta 
dissertação é analisar se o Investimento Direto Estrangeiro no Exterior pode ser 
influenciado por orientações políticas do Governo, em termos de volume e geografia. 
O estudo considera uma amostra de 13 países para o período entre 1996 e 2013, e usa 
uma equação gravitacional para o Investimento Direto Estrangeiro no Exterior 
vi 
 
Português e uma análise de dados em painel. Variáveis específicas são adicionadas para 
testar o impacto da orientação política dos governos. Os resultados mostram que o 
Investimento Direto Estrangeiro no Exterior é influenciado pela dimensão do mercado, 
língua, risco político, a ideologia do Governo Português e também por relações 
específicas com o Brasil, Holanda e Espanha. Esta pesquisa fornece a primeira 
evidência de que, no período estudado, os governos de direita tiveram um impacto 
positivo sobre a Investimento Direto Estrangeiro no Exterior Português. No entanto, em 
contraste com outros estudos, o risco político tem um impacto positivo sobre a 
Investimento Direto Estrangeiro no Exterior, o que pode ser explicado pelas relações 
portuguesas particulares com Angola e Brasil. 
 
Palavras-chave: Investimento Direto Estrangeiro no Exterior, Economia Politica, 
orientação Politica, Portugal. 
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Introduction 
Since the end of Second World War and with the opening of economy, foreign direct 
investment (FDI) started to be relevant for most western developed countries and by 
inherence a reason of its study by economists. 
The FDI can be analysed from the Inward or Outward perspectives, depending on the 
direction of capital flows. Such study takes into consideration the economic, 
institutional and geographic factors of the investment of home and host countries. It has 
been commonly used the gravity equation, in empirical analysis, to relate FDI with 
market size of host and home-countries, with geographic and cultural distances and with 
other specific factors that influence MNEs' investment decisions. 
According to the (UNCTAD, 2014a) data, in 1970 99,7 percent of Outward FDI was 
from developed economies. Nevertheless, between 1980 and 2011, the share of 
Developing Economies in total Outward FDI rose from 6,2 percent to 26,9 percent (Al-
sadiq, 2013). The increase of Outward FDI by Developing Economies may be related 
with the convergence of world economy due to markets globalisation. Narula and 
Dunning (2000, p. 159) mentioned that “Globalization has fundamentally changed 
economic realities”. The same authors postulate that from the MNE perspective there is 
a goal to consolidate their advantages in the global market. From the political standpoint 
there was a reduction on interventionism in MNEs, however governments’ 
responsibility as market facilitator has, in turn, become significantly larger. 
Recent studies refer that the intensity of Outward FDI is affected by specific home 
government policies, which aim to increase the influence of local MNEs into the world 
economy. Zhang, Jiang, and Zhou (2014) developed a set of hypotheses describing that 
political and diplomatic activities may have a positive effect on Chinese Outward FDI. 
High level meetings are facilitators of investments abroad, overcoming difficulties on 
sensitive and important businesses issues. Concerning policy measures, Luo, Xue, and 
Han (2010) in their study say that Chinese Government policies in financial and 
taxation, risk-safeguard mechanisms, information service network and direction guide 
of Outward FDI are facilitating instruments to increase the number of Chinese MNEs in 
the world. The same conclusions on support policies impact on the Italian Outward FDI 
are found in the study by Bannò, Piscitello, and Amorim Varum (2014).  
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Home government policies can influence the intensity of Outward FDI. But does 
government political orientation have impact on the level and spatial orientation of 
MNEs investments? 
In the study of Schneider and Frey (1985) about “Economic and Political Determinants 
of Foreign Direct Investment” it is referred that government political orientations do not 
have influence on Outward FDI, instead, Political stability has. Nevertheless, Mudambi 
and Navarra (2003) studied the impact of Italian intra regional governments political 
orientation on Inward FDI attractiveness and concluded that it was relevant to investors 
decisions. The authors say that “a Center-right orientation is conducive to MNE FDI, 
while a Center-left orientation is not. A Far-left orientation is found to have a very 
negative effect on FDI” (Mudambi & Navarra, 2003, p. 37). The study proves that 
MNEs are affected by the political orientation of the governments involved. 
Apart Schneider and Frey (1985), to the best of our knowledge there are no other 
studies about the impact that the political orientation of governments may have on 
Outward FDI.  
The objective of this Dissertation is to study if the government political orientation 
affects the Outward FDI decisions, namely in terms of intensity and geographical 
orientation. This research focuses on the Portuguese economy case and may give an 
important contribution to the literature about Outward FDI, as well as facilitate future 
studies about Political influence to MNEs investment`s strategy. 
Castro (2004, pp. 6, 7) postulate that Outward FDI is a recent phenomenon in Portugal, 
being relevant in the Portuguese economy from the 1990’s. In order to get a wide and 
strong base, for this study it will be considered the period in between 1996 and 2013. 
The Dissertation is organized as follows: Section 1 presents the literature review with 
the intention of identifying the main determinants of FDI. Additionally, it will look for 
the diplomatic activities related to FDI clarifying how government political orientation 
and policies may influence FDI flows. In Section 2 an analysis on Portuguese Outward 
FDI development, FDI Portuguese policy sum up, detailed information about 
methodological considerations, specifically, the econometric model, the sample, the 
explanatory variables and respective data sources and also a descriptive and correlation 
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analysis. Section 3 presents and discusses the main empirical results, and finally the 
Conclusions are presented.  
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SECTION 1 -  Literature review and hypotheses 
This section reviews the literature about FDI and Outward FDI, as well as the relation 
of Politics to Economy and FDI. Considering the theoretical explanations it will be 
formulated hypotheses that are also based on tested empirical applications.  
1.1. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
The definition of FDI is referred in the Balance of Payments Manual (IMF, 1993, p. 86) 
as being a “significant influence that gives the investor an effective voice in 
management foreign-controlled sector, the primary distinguishing feature is control.”. 
Furthermore, “direct investor, who is resident in another economy, owns 10 percent or 
more of the ordinary shares or voting power (for an incorporated enterprise) or the 
equivalent (for an unincorporated enterprise). Direct investment enterprises comprise 
those entities that are subsidiaries (a non resident investor owns more than 50 percent), 
associates (an investor owns 50 percent or less) and branches (wholly or jointly owned 
unincorporated enterprises) either directly or indirectly owned by the direct investor”. 
The motivations to firms internationalize are related to the fact that companies have 
specific advantages which can be exploited in foreign markets. Despite their costs, 
benefits are greater than the investment. Imperfect markets are one of the reasons for the 
focus on internationalization, as it allows overcoming barriers of varied nature (Hymer, 
1976). The Hymer’s study reinforces the conclusions of Dunning (1973) about the 
determinants of international production.  
Internationalization by FDI is according to Dunning (1988) determined via the existence 
of three types of conditions. The company is expected to have Ownership, Location and 
Internalization advantages. This is the so called Eclectic Paradigm or OLI paradigm 
introduced on Dunning’s study in 1977 “Trade, location of economic activity and the 
MNE: A search for an eclectic approach”. 
Through the nature or nationality of firms, internationalization occurs by taking 
advantages of ownership. Sometimes these advantages are related to monopolistic or 
competitive firms (Dunning, 1988, p. 2). Due to location advantages, manufacturing 
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production tends to be concentrated in regions. This is associated with lower cost of 
transports, stronger scale economies and share of spending manufactured products, so 
firms do FDI to gain market advantages (Dunning, 1988, p. 4; Krugman, 1990). 
Companies look for additional efficiency and increase competitiveness, which could be 
aimed by internalizing or externalizing activities (Buckley & Casson, 1998, p. 541; 
Princen, 1997) . 
Looking at the main proposals of FDI theory, Buckley et al. (2007, p. 500) says “ (1) 
firms internalise missing or imperfect external markets until the costs of further 
internalisation outweigh the benefits; and (2) firms choose locations for their constituent 
activities that minimise the overall costs of their operations”. 
Based on this, Dunning and Lundan (2008) identify four motivations for 
internationalization, thus MNEs look for foreign markets based on the following 
motivations: market seeking, efficiency seeking, resource seeking and strategic asset 
seeking.  
 Market seeking FDI 
Dunning and Lundan (2008) suggest that MNEs seek out for new markets by FDI 
because e.g. sales potentials corresponding to the size and growth of foreign markets 
and the possibility to access more markets.  
 Efficiency seeking FDI 
FDI it is important to e.g. rationalize structures of supply and distribution, explore gains 
of economies of scale or risk diversification (Dunning & Lundan, 2008). Concerning 
risk,  Rugman (1979) refers that by diversifying FDI, MNE’s can reduce the impact of 
market imperfections in relation to e.g. interest rates, wage earnings, share price 
indexes.  
 Resource seeking FDI 
Dunning and Lundan (2008) say that MNEs invest abroad in order to access cheaper 
raw materials, natural resources, low cost operations, or attainment of low cost of 
labour.  
 Asset seeking FDI 
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Additionally Dunning and Lundan (2008) consider as long-term strategies, essentially 
acquisitions and joint ventures. In this way, MNE can overcome needs of special assets, 
such as knowledge (R&D), as resources in unfamiliar markets or acquisition of 
particular information in markets. 
 Other motivations to FDI 
Dunning and Lundan (2008) also refer that MNEs may use FDI in order to avoid 
country of origin restrictive legislation of governments (“escape investments”), or with 
the purpose of supporting other multinational activities (“support investments”) or even 
as an indirect result of mergers and acquisitions (passive investments”). 
 
1.2. Political economy view of outward FDI  
“Political economists have long argued that the interaction between businesses and 
governments is a complex, dynamic, and interdependent process in which governments 
create the rules by which businesses must abide, while businesses make efforts to shape 
governmental policies” (Luo et al., 2010, p. 69). Rugman (1998) referred that the 
government controls, regulates and judges business, by creating legislation establishing 
a regulatory environment. 
Although the main objectives of governments are to increase social welfare (Helpman 
& Krugman, 1985; King & Levine, 2004; Levine, 1997), yet,  government’s 
interference may create inefficiency and be counterproductive in markets (Edwards & 
Keen, 1996; Inman & Rubinfeld, 1996), otherwise it can pull over the economy 
efficiency with the introduction of experience (Charoenrat & Harvie, 2014; Ng & Gujar, 
2009). 
Even though the different positive or negative opinions about political interference, 
from MNE perspective, home or host country governments may have a special role in 
its business strategy development.  
The World Trade Organization (WTO), with its principles of trade liberalisation, had in 
2014 the representation of 160 governments. Such large number of countries does not 
mean there is no influence in the market by the elected representatives. Since the 
creation of WTO, traditional barriers, such as tariffs, have decreased to the level of 
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3.8% in industrial products
1
. Nevertheless, according to Rickard and Kono (2014, p. 
350) home governments tend to protect local companies, implicitly, as “treaty violations 
are difficult to observe and prove” which means that “international agreements are 
largely ineffective in constraining national governments”.  In their study, is referred that 
government procurement in developed countries it amounts to 15% to 20% of GDP, 
which is interesting to local and foreign companies business. Despite the existence of 
international procurement agreements, that aim to foresee an open market, this does not 
have a strong impact on the government’s actions/decisions to pursue the protection of 
local companies. This approach may spoil the development of the local economy, as it 
impacts negatively on its progress by reducing imports or FDI.  
Concerning economic advantages, Lall and Narula (2004, p. 448) postulate that 
liberalisation towards FDI openness “as a means of acquiring technologies, skills and 
access to international markets, and of entering dynamic trade and production systems 
internal to multinational enterprises (MNEs)”. Chakrabarti (2001) says that openness 
has a strong correlation to the level of FDI and by inherence the development of 
economy, referring that “policy makers, intent on increasing FDI, to increase 
participation in international trade”. There are evident advantages having an open 
market that will impact on the development of economy. Such result derives from 
receiving FDI into home market, but also by the increase of domestic MNEs knowledge 
outwards, which means that governments look at FDI as an important issue in their 
policy.   
Knoerich (2012) has referred from the point of view of Outward FDI as being positive 
to home countries progress. In this study about the development of Outward FDI, he 
says that there are good indicators about the impact that investment done external has 
into the home economy, via the inflow of profits, but also by the improvement on 
knowledge and efficiency via reverse spillovers. Although the first perception of 
Outward FDI is benefits loss, because of capital outflow, the increase means that home 
economy is in a high level of development. Such idea is largely identified as the 
                                                 
 
1
 e.g from 1995 to 2000 it was cut 40% on tariffs for industrial products (WTO, 2015) 
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Investment Development Path of Dunning’s theory (Dunning, 1981). This theory 
proposes that companies invest abroad when their home economy is enough developed 
which relates Outward FDI to a condition of economic development (Dunning & 
Narula, 1996 : cited by Castro 2000).  
The importance that economic growth has to the home country concerning social and 
economic issues it cannot be ignored. It means that governments look at the Outward 
FDI as a significant subject to be considered in their institutional policies (Steven 
Globerman & Shapiro, 2002; Luo et al., 2010).  The authors have studied the FDI flows 
(inward and outward) of developing and developed countries, concluding that there is a 
strong relation between good political governance and economic development. Policies 
promoting competition, transparency and good institutional governance increase inward 
FDI, and by inherence promote the appearance and growth of home country MNC, 
increasing Outward FDI.   
Concerning the China case, Luo et al. (2010) found that the government has an 
important role in promoting Outward FDI. The authors refer that the Chinese 
government have implemented several measures, such as, financial and taxation special 
policies, risk safeguard mechanisms, information service network and direction 
guidance of Outward FDI in order to help Chinese MNCs to overcome firm competitive 
disadvantages in foreign markets. 
We can conclude that the support a home country government can have to the business 
development of MNC, should not be ignored. There are mutual interests concerning 
Outward FDI. From the government point of view, the issue is economic development 
and from the MNE point of view is profit increase.  
 
1.3. The determinants of Outward FDI: some hypotheses from 
the theoretical and empirical literature 
1.3.1. Market size and Growth rate 
One of the determinants that it is generally associated as significant to FDI is market 
size. In the study of the determinants of FDI, Chakrabarti (2001) found in his survey 
about FDI studies,  strong evidence that higher GDP per capita, referred as market size, 
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has a positive relation to FDI.  Same conclusions can be found in the study of Blonigen 
and Piger (2014) about determinants of FDI concerning parent-country GDP. In their 
study, it was found positive relation of FDI level to the fact of home and host countries 
have similar levels of GDP. Besides that, host country GDP level has a confirmed effect 
on the attraction of FDI, considered by the authors that “wealth of the source country is 
a key determinant of FDI” (Blonigen & Piger, 2014, p. 800). 
Buckley et al. (2007) by consistent empirical support, show that Chinese Outward direct 
investment flows depend upon the GDP levels and the rates of GDP growth in host 
countries.  
We may conclude that depending on home and host countries GDP indicators 
performance, firms would do investments where economy expansion is expected to be 
stronger. This means, that if a home economy has better indicators, it will attract 
investment of local firms and foreign ones. On the contrary, MNEs would invest 
outwards if the home economy growth has worse performance than foreign countries. 
Hypothesis 1a: Host country GDP per capita has a positive effect on Outward FDI 
Hypothesis 1b: Host country Growth rates has a positive effect on Outward FDI 
1.3.2. Natural Resources 
Big countries have in their FDI objectives, the control of natural resources in order to 
decrease the dependency on such important assets like Oil – this result was confirmed 
for  Russia (Kalotay & Sulstarova, 2010) and China (Buckley et al., 2007). Concerning 
Outward FDI of Chinese MNEs, there is a strong evidence in the study of Kolstad and 
Wiig (2012) that there is a positive relation of investment in countries with institutional 
problems but with high level of natural resources. These countries are in the world 
economy those that are considered as the poorest. This paradigm is explained as “The 
curse of natural resources”, where “resource abundant countries tended to be high-price 
economies and that, partly as a consequence, these countries tended to miss-out on 
export-led growth” (Sachs & Warner, 2001). It means that poor countries are likely to 
be the ones with high levels of natural resources but with lower levels of GDP growth, 
on the contrary richest countries have lower levels of natural resources but high levels 
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of GDP. In order to control natural resources, big countries do investments in poor 
countries, by means of outward FDI.  
Hypothesis 2: Natural resources on host countries have a positive effect in Outward 
FDI 
1.3.3. Taxes and Tariffs 
The study by Kemsley (1998) which has analysed the effect of taxes rate and foreign tax 
credit incentives to the local U.S.A MNEs, concluded that MNEs outweigh costs of 
exporting instead of producing in foreign countries, using relatively more exports 
instead foreign production to deliver goods to high-tax foreign markets. Depending on 
the taxes incentives of home or host countries, MNEs define whether to export or 
produce outwards. It was found strong evidence that U.S.A. MNEs do exports to 
countries with high-tax instead of foreign production. 
In terms of after-tax profits, according to Grubert and Mutti (1991) MNEs “have the 
incentive to increase their after-tax profits by shifting taxable income from affiliates 
incorporated in high-tax countries to subsidiaries in low-tax countries”. By empirical 
analysis, it was concluded that MNEs shift their income profits to countries with very 
low tax, which is a solid reason for MNEs to divert FDI into these countries. Moreover, 
statutory tax rate have more impact than effective tax rate, meaning MNEs decisions on 
FDI are further related to the levels of direct tax applied to the performance of MNEs. 
Further study about taxes influence on investment outwards was developed by the same 
authors Mutti and Grubert (2004). They analysed the taxes effects of 47 countries on 
U.S.A. Outward FDI during the 1982, 1989, and 1994 periods. By the analysis of 728 
parent firms affiliate location choice, it was concluded that taxes have a strong effect on 
their investments option. Nevertheless, the effect is less noticed in countries with high 
level of GDP. Concerning this conclusion, the authors say “taxes are less of a deterrent 
to location in high income economies, perhaps because they offer better infrastructure, 
agglomeration benefits, or a uniquely attractive market opportunity. Those high-income 
countries are better able to ignore competitive pressures to cut their own taxes”.  
More recently, Barrios, Huizinga, Laeven, and Nicodème (2012) have made a study 
about the same implications referred by Mutti and Grubert (2004), taking 33 European 
countries MNEs during the 1999-2003 period. The results point out a strong negative 
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effect of taxes in MNEs decisions, even in case that parent country taxation can be 
deferred until income is repatriated.  
Concerning to tariffs, Levy and Nolan (1991) referred that neither uncontrolled tariffs 
nor restrictions on FDI will increase benefits to the home markets, as protecting home 
firms could reduce its competitiveness and country welfare. Situations of monopoly, 
depending on tariffs and restrictions level, equilibrium at the market structures could be 
possible. This can be achievable when a home market has monopoly companies. 
Foreign companies having conditions to enter into home market will compete, 
increasing competitiveness and social welfare. In case of foreign companies be 
monopoly, entering into the home country market and replacing a local monopoly 
company, it will enhance benefits and knowledge of home economy. If a foreign 
company monopoly can substitute a home country monopoly, it is because is more 
efficient and has higher know-how. 
Grubert and Mutti (1991) say tariffs have high impact on the decisions of FDI. This is 
due to the fact that exporting to countries with high tariffs, will increase goods price, 
what means the products can be ignored by the consumer because of their price. The 
way to overcome this barrier, and increase sales on markets with high tariffs, is by 
doing investment in a company at this market by means Outward FDI. 
About tariffs effects on European Union MNEs investments choice in foreign countries, 
Cardamone and Scoppola (2015) analysed France, Germany, Netherlands, Italy and 
United Kingdom Outward FDI made in 24 partner countries during the period of 1995-
2008. Industry levels were disaggregated in order to understand if there were different 
impact effects on horizontal and vertical FDI. It was concluded that tariffs applied by 
European Union countries to products that are re-imported, vertical FDI, have a 
negative impact on Outward FDI. Nevertheless, concerning horizontal FDI, it is clear 
that tariffs have a positive effect on Outward FDI.  
Hypothesis 3a: Lower taxes level in host countries than in home country have a 
positive effect on Outward FDI 
Hypothesis 3b: Tariffs in host countries have a positive effect on Outward FDI 
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1.3.4. Openness and Incentives 
Findlay (1978) postulate that FDI increase the pace of technical progress in the host 
country, being more common having more advantages receiving new technology than 
lending it. This idea is corroborated by the study of Liu and Wang (2003), having as an 
evidence that the increasing of R&D level and firm size where the most important 
factors to enhance productivity in Chinese industries. Barrell and Pain (1999) refer that 
FDI is directly linked to process growth and higher integration of the European 
countries and Görg and Greenaway (2004) refer that FDI is a key driver of economic 
growth and development.  
Being FDI so important, governments offer incentives to attract this type of investment, 
motivated by the expectation of spillovers benefits in order to enhance national income 
from new investments (Görg & Greenaway, 2004). Attractiveness to FDI of the host 
countries may be influenced by government policies in a wide multiplicity of ways, 
indirect and implicit or explicit (Steven Globerman & Shapiro, 1999). Also a home 
country government can be a powerful ally to MNEs, offering diverse institutional 
tools, such as fiscal incentives and funds, creating conditions for firms’ development. 
Increasing capabilities, MNEs will be prepared to compete abroad, what means 
Outward FDI growth. (Luo et al., 2010).  
Given the above reasons, MNEs and government have mutual interests and it means 
that flows of FDI also depend on willingness and capacity to attract FDI.  
Hypothesis 4: Openness and Political incentives have a positive effect on Outward FDI  
1.3.5. Geographical and Cultural Distance 
Buckley and Casson (1976), postulates that FDI by MNEs exists because internalisation 
benefits are higher than costs and this process would continue until the reverse occurs.  
According to Uppsala School (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977, 1990; Johanson & 
Wiedersheim‐Paul, 1975) the involvement that firms arise in the internationalisation 
process, may be smaller or larger, depending on internal and on external factors. The 
internal factors mean those the company holds, such as the perception of competitive 
advantages over its competitors, management strategies and marketing or the erosion of 
results. The external factors are the progress of its customers or competitors in the 
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international market, government policies or bank financing. Through the above 
reasons, companies may choose for a gradual process of internationalization, first 
export, after through licensing schemes and finally with a higher level of commitment 
by FDI. However, depending on the ability of companies and their degree of 
involvement, this evolutionary process may not have this progression, and sometimes 
can be overcome by starting on a higher level (FDI). The influence of physic distance 
(e.g. cultural and historical) affects the decisions on internationalisation, and also at 
high level, on FDI. 
 Geographical distance 
Geographical distance has impact on the decisions of FDI, as managing an affiliate at a 
higher distance has greater costs (Drogendijk & Martín Martín, 2014; Grosse & 
Trevino, 1996; Siegel, Licht, & Schwartz, 2013).  
 Cultural Distance 
Cultural distance has a strong negative impact on FDI (Grosse & Trevino, 1996). 
According to Siegel et al. (2013), differences on egalitarianism affect negatively MNEs 
on FDI destinations. The same conclusions for Spain are referred by Drogendijk and 
Martín Martín (2014).  
 Past colonial Ties  
In the study by Siegel et al. (2013) about FDI relation to egalitarianism and cultural 
distance, although with low relevance, there is always a positive effect with several 
determinants of  FDI if exists common languages and colonial heritage. Head and Ries 
(2008) refer there is a positive relation to FDI when exist past colonial ties taking into 
consideration the relation between 30 OECD and 32 partner countries.   
In the particular case of Southern African countries, Mhlanga, Blalock, and Christy 
(2010) found that colonial ties have an important influence on FDI, which are the 
examples of English and Portuguese language countries, where their former colonizers 
have larger volume of investment.  
Hypothesis 5a: Geographical distance has a negative effect on Outward FDI 
Hypothesis 5b: Cultural inequality has a negative effect on Outward FDI  
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Hypothesis 5c: Common language between home and host countries has positive effect 
on Outward FDI 
1.3.6. Imports and Exports 
Mundell (1957) developed a model showing how trade impediments can stimulate 
capital movements, referring that FDI is an export substitute.  
Considering the product cycle model developed by Vernon (1966) FDI is an export 
substitute, as the trade patterns of the less-developed countries and high-developed ones 
are different.  Besides that, as soon a product is standardized, it gets more advantageous 
to produce it in less-developed countries as the production costs are lower than the 
existent ones in developed countries. This happens because there is no high know-how 
need to manufacture goods already in mature phase, as they come as a standardized 
product. Afterwards, it is explained that less-developed countries will export these 
products to the developed ones, meaning that there will be a positive effect on imports, 
from the developed countries point of view.  
More recently, analysing the Portuguese trade case, Africano and Magalhães (2005) 
investigated the relation between the Portuguese FDI stock and trade flows among 
OECD countries and Brazil for the period amid 1998 and 2000. They concluded 
Portuguese Inward FDI has a very positive impact on exports, and Outward FDI has no 
impact on imports or exports. Africano and Magalhães (2005) have used a sample of 28 
countries, meaning in average 89% of Portuguese exports and 87% of imports, being 
representative of 90% inward FDI and the destination of 91% outward FDI. The impact 
of Portuguese Outward FDI on domestic exports is referred by Africano and Magalhães 
(2005) not to be relevant. Later, Fonseca, Mendonça, and Passos (2009b) have made a 
study on the effects of Portuguese Outward FDI in exports, using a sample of 18 host 
countries (UE15- Belgium aggregated to Luxembourg, U.S.A., Angola, Brazil, China 
and Japan) in the period in between 1996 and 2007, and there were different 
conclusions about Outward FDI impact. Fonseca et al. (2009b) found a strong 
substitution effect on Portuguese exports for almost of countries, with relevance to 
Japan and China. The exceptions were Angola and Spain (at 5% significance level), 
which may be related to the market seeking motives of Portuguese firms. In relation to 
15 
 
Imports they found a positive impact with the increase of Outward FDI in the European 
Union. The exception identified was Angola but with insignificant result.  
Hypothesis 6a: Exports to host country are negatively related to Outward FDI 
Hypothesis 6b: Imports from host country are positively related to Outward FDI 
1.3.7. Political risk and Democracy 
Helpman and Krugman (1985) say that firm internationalization may lead to economic 
development globally, increasing social welfare and competitiveness. This idea is also 
corroborated by (King & Levine, 2004; Levine, 1997).  Roe and Siegel (2011) refer that 
political instability explains variations in financial development around the world. 
Democratic political stability is a necessary condition to the economic development, in 
contrast instability may be a barrier to economy growth. Democracy, political stability 
and economic growth are related, and they are important for the development of 
economies (Feng, 1997). The flows of FDI links to the fact that economies have to have 
stability, so it means, it is important that governments are based on a democracy. Jensen 
(2003) postulates that democratic governments attract 70% of FDI.  
Roe and Siegel (2011) say that political instability is important to explain variation in 
financial development in the world, referring that democratic political stability is a 
necessary condition to progress whereas political instability is a serious impediment.  
Hypothesis 7: Democracy at the host country has a positive effect on Outward FDI  
1.3.8. Bilateral International Treaties  
On the study of Zhang et al. (2014) it is referred that Chinese bilateral activities provide 
effective support in important investments, which is the case of the cooperation between 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China and Millenium bank of Portugal and the 
partnership involving Huawei and Portugal Telecom. Another example is the 
Volkswagen group, where the governments of the Czech Republic and Portugal had a 
special involvement at a high level, participating in senior meetings aiming to get 
investments of this company into their home countries. In the Czech Republic case, it 
was described by Pavlínek (1998), the involvement of the government as a contribution 
to the local economic activity increasing. Concerning to Portugal,  high level 
government institutional staff has given an important contribution to FDI attraction, by 
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creating special incentives to business development (Vale, 2004). The above examples 
show how governments can help to catch private investments into countries, improving 
home economy and their development. With the progress of economy, local companies 
would also increase knowledge and be prepared to compete in foreign countries. 
Concerning government support to MNEs, Fornes and Butt-Philip (2011) have made a 
general review of the business relation between China and Latin American countries. In 
this case, the Chinese government has a strong link pursuing signing trade and 
investment agreements in order to increase competitiveness of their MNEs. The 
involvement of the Chinese government is very high, as the main companies taking part 
in the Latin American countries business are stated-owned, so there is necessary country 
administration participation. Besides that, the type of agreements with Latin America 
countries is essentially trade and investment, instead of intellectual ones. This is 
explained by the authors with the fact that these countries are in developing phase, it 
means there are no sensible issues concerning industrial know-how. Moreover, the fact 
that Chinese competitive capability is lower than MNEs of developed countries already 
implemented in these geographical area, the main agreements are focused in creating 
conditions so that Chinese MNEs compete at the same level concerning production 
activities, facilitating the transaction of goods and investments. In this work it was 
suggested to develop empirical work in order to understand the issues that interfere in 
the business development. Carlos Sosa Varela, Fornes, and Butt-Philip (2014) have 
made this analysis and found that Chinese Government support does not have 
interference in the Chinese business development in Latin America, but the capabilities 
of MNEs are the main factor.  This conclusion is based on an interview method to 
Chinese MNEs, where they do not see the intervention of their Government as the key 
factor to do investments in the Latin America region. Although this is not the main 
factor, it is explained that the support made by the Government is the same compared to 
other countries like the U.S.A., where there is specific assistance to big companies and 
also to strategic ones. This idea is corroborated by Jenkins (2012), referring that Latin 
America is seen as an economic strategic area. Since China has become member of 
WTO in 2001, the economic relation with Latin America has increase the performance 
of Chinese trade balance, being in the near future an important region to FDI.  Although 
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FDI depends on the capacity of MNEs, Government has an important role concerning 
economic and political issues, creating useful conditions to business relations.  
In the case of the U.S.A., MNEs Desbordes (2010) concluded that there are two kinds of 
political risk that may interfere on FDI, which are global and diplomatic. By global, he 
means that the relation with the host country is critical for a large number of countries, 
instead the diplomatic is mainly between home and host country. It is clear that a 
country with diplomatic problems with several other countries is not appealing to 
business and it interferes with FDI. Concerning diplomatic tensions, it interferes 
negatively on MNEs business, as host countries look at them as an extension of home 
countries. “[S]ignificant impact of diplomatic risk implies that the home country can 
influence the business environment faced by its firms abroad”. On the contrary, 
diplomatic links between host and home countries may increase attractiveness of FDI. 
By empirical analysis, Desbordes and Vicard (2009) have concluded that “having good 
interstate political relations increase FDI”, namely the existence of bilateral investment 
treaties “work as a commitment device: the host government’s credible commitment not 
to expropriate foreign investors is more valuable when MNEs face risks related to 
interstate political tensions”. 
In the case of developing countries Neumayer and Spess (2005) found quantitative 
evidence that “[d]eveloping countries that sign more BITs with developed countries 
receive more FDI inflows”. 
Hypothesis 8: BITs between home and to host countries have a positive effect on 
Outward FDI 
1.3.9. Government Ideology 
Left-wing parties programmes are conventionally oriented to increase social welfare, in 
contrast to market-oriented policies that are typical of the right-centre wing parties 
(Biresselioglu & Zengin Karaibrahimoglu, 2012) .  
According to Vachudova (2008, p. 389) right-wing parties appeal to nationalism, law 
and order and social conservatism. Kitschelt (1995, p. 462), refers that they highlight 
authority, order, collectivist morality, looking at a national autonomy.  
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In the study of Thorisdottir, Jost, Liviatan, and Shrout (2007), it is referred that right-
wing parties of Western Europe countries, are traditionalist and conservative, while left-
wing parties aim to introduce greater equality and egalitarianism. 
Despite the different political orientations, concerning party’s economic agenda, the 
demand of the economy is a better predictor than ideology. Parties may differ in base 
orientations, but concerning economic issues, they can have similar ideas (Vachudova, 
2008).   
Crossing economy with political issues, Schneider and Frey (1985) referred in his study 
about determinants of U.S.A. Outward FDI, they say rhetorically that host government’s 
with left-wing ideology do not have the same aperture of right-wing ones. Nevertheless, 
they concluded that “ideological position (right or left orientation) does not have a 
statistically significant influence” on FDI, but political stability has. Nonetheless, the 
study of Schneider and Frey (1985) consider the right-wing party as “pure” capitalist 
state, putting others outside, what may envisage the conclusions on government 
ideology effect. In order to understand the effects of ideology, we also add host and 
home countries ideology effect, as referred by S. Globerman, Shapiro, and Tang (2006), 
similar regimes may be a factor to explain capital flows.  
Hypothesis 9a: Right wing government ideology influence positively Outward FDI 
Hypothesis 9b: The Same government ideology of home country and host countries has 
a positive effect on Outward FDI 
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FDI Outward Determinants Literature Review: A Synthesis 
 
Table 1 – FDI Outward Determinants Literature Review: A Synthesis 
Determinant Hypotheses Methodology Effect sign Author (Year) 
Market size / GDP per 
capita 
1a 
Extreme Bound Analysis + Chakrabarti (2001) 
Bayesian statistical techniques + Blonigen and Piger (2014) 
Pooled ordinary least squares (POLS); Random effects (RE) 
generalised least squares method 
+ Buckley et al. (2007) 
Growth Rate 1b 
Extreme Bound Analysis + Chakrabarti (2001) 
Pooled ordinary least squares (POLS); Random effects (RE) 
generalised least squares method 
+ Buckley et al. (2007) 
Natural Resources 
endowment 
2 
Lagrangian multiplier (LM); Pooled ordinary least squares 
(POLS); 
+ 
Kalotay and Sulstarova 
(2010) 
Pooled ordinary least squares (POLS);0 Random effects (RE) 
generalised least squares method 
+ but 
Insignificant 
Buckley et al. (2007) 
Two stage least square (2SLS) + Kolstad and Wiig (2012) 
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Regression analysis + Sachs and Warner (2001) 
Taxes 3a 
Pooled ordinary least squares (POLS) - Kemsley (1998) 
Two stage least square (2SLS) - Grubert and Mutti (1991) 
Pooled ordinary least squares (POLS);0 Random effects (RE)  - Mutti and Grubert (2004) 
Pooled ordinary least squares (POLS) Timed Fixed Effect - Barrios et al. (2012) 
Tariffs 3b 
Two stage least square (2SLS) + Grubert and Mutti (1991) 
Pooled ordinary least squares (POLS); Fixed effects (FE) + 
Cardamone and Scoppola 
(2015) 
Openness and Incentives 4 
Regression analysis + Barrell and Pain (1999) 
Literature review + 
Görg and Greenaway 
(2004) 
Ordinary Least Squares, Regression analysis + 
Steven Globerman and 
Shapiro (1999) 
Empirical analysis + Luo et al. (2010) 
Geographical distance 5a Case study and empirical analysis  
(Johanson & Vahlne, 
1977); Johanson and 
Vahlne (1990); (Johanson 
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& Wiedersheim‐Paul, 
1975) 
Partial least squares-based structural equations modelling - 
Drogendijk and Martín 
Martín (2014) 
Ordinary least squares (OLS); Random effects (RE) - Grosse and Trevino (1996) 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression - Siegel et al. (2013) 
Cultural inequality 5b 
Case study and empirical analysis  
(Johanson & Vahlne, 
1977); Johanson and 
Vahlne (1990); (Johanson 
& Wiedersheim‐Paul, 
1975) 
Ordinary least squares (OLS); Random effects (RE) - Grosse and Trevino (1996) 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression - Siegel et al. (2013) 
Partial least squares-based structural equations modelling - 
Drogendijk and Martín 
Martín (2014) 
Common language 5c 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression + Siegel et al. (2013) 
Fixed effects (FE) + Head and Ries (2008) 
Pooled ordinary least squares (POLS); Fixed effects (FE) + Mhlanga et al. (2010) 
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Exports 6a 
Cross-section one with a OLS estimation Insignificant 
Africano and Magalhães 
(2005) 
Random effects (RE) - Fonseca et al. (2009b) 
Imports 6b Cross-section one with a OLS estimation Insignificant 
Africano and Magalhães 
(2005) 
Democracy 7 
Pooled ordinary least squares (POLS); Fixed effects (FE) 
+ (Political 
stability 
associated to 
democracy) 
Roe and Siegel (2011) 
Pooled ordinary least squares (POLS) + Jensen (2003) 
Bilateral Investment 
Treaties 
8 
Pooled ordinary least squares (POLS) + Zhang et al. (2014) 
Empirical analysis + Pavlínek (1998) 
Survey analysis + Vale (2004) 
Case study and survey analysis  Insignificant 
Fornes and Butt-Philip 
(2011) 
Case study and survey analysis  
Carlos Sosa Varela et al. 
(2014) 
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Empirical analysis + Jenkins (2012) 
Pooled ordinary least squares (POLS); Fixed effects (FE) + 
Desbordes (2010); 
(Desbordes & Vicard, 
2009) 
Fixed effects (FE) + 
Neumayer and Spess 
(2005) 
Government Ideology 
9a Pooled ordinary least squares (POLS) 
+ but 
Insignificant 
Schneider and Frey (1985) 
9b Random effects (RE) 
+ but 
Insignificant 
S. Globerman et al. (2006) 
 Source: The author based on literature review 
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SECTION 2 - Outward FDI in Portugal: descriptive 
analysis  
According to Castro (2004, pp. 6, 7) Outward FDI  started to have more relevance from 
the 1990’s in Portugal. In order to understand this development, an analysis on the 
Portuguese Investment Development Path will be considered, taking as reference 
Castro’s study. Although the Investment Development Path theory interprets both 
Inward and Outward FDI to evaluate the Economy Development level, there is a high 
relation on country progress to high Outward FDI levels. From the moment of this 
study, a change occurred in the Balance of Payments data, and based on that, a 
comparison among methods (BPM5 and BPM6) is given to understand Outward FDI 
differences. Moreover,   it is analyzed the Portuguese Outward FDI evolution. 
Considering the main question of this study, if Governments ideology influence on 
Outward FDI, it will be described the main FDI Governments programmes during the 
period between 1996 and 2013. During this period several measures were implemented, 
nevertheless, not always aiming to increase Outward FDI. Based on the literature 
review (Section 1) and Portuguese economy characteristics, a regression model is 
defined. Afterwards, it is described the variables as well as the data source. Before 
going to the empirical analysis (Section 3), it will be made a descriptive examination as 
well as a correlation analysis between variables.  
2.1. Portuguese Investment Development Path 
The Investment Development Path of Dunning’s theory, introduced by (Dunning and 
Narula (1996): cited by Dunning 2001) and subsequently revised by  Dunning (2001); 
Dunning and Narula (1996), it indicates that an investor country with high level of 
Outward FDI, means that it is more developed. A country with relevant Outward FDI 
indicates that MNEs reach a high level of ownership advantage what may lead to 
increase predominance in foreign markets. This theory identifies five stages of 
development; “Stage 1 is associated with pre industrialization; stage two the 
development of some location specific advantages namely by government policies; 
stage three is associated with less spectacular growth rates of inward FDI eventually 
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overtaken by outward FDI; stage 4 when countries turn into net outward investors and 
finally stage 5 leading developed countries with permanently high stocks of both inward 
and outward FDI” (Dunning, 2001, pp. 181, 182). 
Analysing the Portuguese case, according to Castro (2004, p. 80) stage 1 occurred until 
1960. Transition to Stage 2, seemed to materialize from middle of 1960’s, nevertheless, 
it was not completed until the 1980’s. Stage 3, is reached at the middle of 1990’s. 
However, Úbeda (2000, p. 151) and Dunning and Narula (2003, p. Chapter 7) referred 
that Portugal had reached the Stage 3 earlier, at the end of 1980’s, since 1995, Portugal 
has increased Outward FDI exponentially, which seems an entering in Stage 4. On the 
other hand, a net outward stock of Portuguese FDI conceals deterioration in the 
country’s attractiveness as a location of foreign investment, which means the 
Portuguese market became economically less interesting (Castro, 2004, p. 81). 
According to Dunning (1981, 1986, 2001), to achieve Stage 4 a country needs to have 
high levels of Inward and Outward FDI simultaneously.  
Castro (2000, p. 30) says “The investment development path suggests an association 
between a country’s level of development (proxied by GDP per capita) and its 
international investment position (net outward FDI stock per capita). The basic 
hypothesis is that, as the country develops, the conditions facing domestic and foreign 
companies change. This will have an impact on the flows of inward and outward FDI”. 
Since the study by Castro, concerning the Portuguese economy, there are some studies 
about this theme by (Fonseca, Mendonça, & Passos, 2007, 2009a). Although they found 
relations between economic development level to Inward and Outward FDI intensity, 
the study had some limitations concerning development stages identification.  
The above studies about the Investment Development Path were based on data 
according to the Balance of Payments Manual 5
th
 Edition (BPM5) method which have 
been released in 1993. In 2009 the IMF has released the Balance Of Payments Manual 
6
th
 Edition (BPM6) and since 2014 the European countries have implemented this 
methodology in their national accounts (European Comission, 2012). Concerning FDI 
there are significant differences between methodologies. BPM5 measures the FDI on a 
directional basis, instead BPM6 on gross assets and liabilities source. Besides this 
difference there is an interpretation concerning fellow enterprises, which is now explicit 
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with BPM6. Although both methodologies do not change the FDI Balance, total Inward 
and Outward FDI have changes (IMF, 2015, p. 126) 
Taking into account the Portuguese 2014 FDI data, in Table 2 we can see the 
differences between new and old methods concerning Assets/Outward and 
Liabilities/Inward FDI stocks in Million Euros. 
Table 2 – BPM6 and BPM5 methods comparison 
  BPM6 BPM5 New/Old (%) 
Direct Investment Assets / Outward FDI 75.239 48.065 157% 
Direct Investment Liabilities / Inward FDI 116.553 89.379 130% 
Net 41.314 41.314 100% 
Source: Own calculations based on Banco de Portugal (2015) 
Considering the new procedures on national accountancy, some conclusions in previous 
studies can be questioned nowadays. A graph with the Inward and Outward FDI stocks 
from 1996 to 2014 using both methods is illustrated bellow. 
Graph 1 - Portuguese FDI (Inward - Outward) BPM6 vs. BPM5 (1996 and 2014) 
 
Source: Own calculations based on Banco de Portugal (2015) 
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2.2. Portuguese Outward FDI 
Even if the results of Castro and Fonseca studies may have some differences due to the 
period that they covered and to the Balance Of Payments Manual change, it is patent 
that Outward FDI level indicates the development of countries, in line with Dunning’s 
Investment Development Path theory. 
Simões and Cartaxo (2012) have made a study concerning Outward FDI from Portugal 
and its policy context. The authors analyzed the Portuguese Outward FDI stocks and 
flows during the period in between 2000 and 2011. As referred by the authors, Portugal 
more than tripled between 2000 and 2011 FDI stocks
2
. In Graph 2 it is visible the 
evolution of Portuguese Outward FDI. 
Graph 2 - Portuguese Outward FDI according to BPM6 1996-2014 
 
Source: Own calculations based on Banco de Portugal (2015) 
                                                 
 
2
 Concerning to this consideration, their analysis was based in US Dollar data; which in case of using 
Euro, due to exchange rates, the increase is not so significant, being from 20.867,60 Million Euro to 
50.055,99 Million Euro (see graph 2) 
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Although the difference between BPM5 and BPM6 methods, concerning to stocks 
variation, there is not a significant change. This means the author’s FDI stock 
interpretation is adequate with the new method, as it is visible in Table 3. 
Table 3 - Portuguese Outward variation between 2000 and 2011 (BPM6 and BPM5 
comparison) 
  BPM6 BPM5 
Direct Investment Assets / Outward FDI (2000) 26.115 20.868 
Direct Investment Assets / Outward FDI (2011) 63.749 50.056 
Variation % 40,97% 41,69% 
Source: Own calculations based on Banco de Portugal (2015) 
Simões and Cartaxo (2012) with reference to Outward FDI flows between 2000 and 
2004, say that the average was more or less stable, instead between 2005 and 2009 it 
was on a declining. In 2007-2008 the deterioration of Outward FDI is associated by the 
authors to the global financial and economic crisis where Portuguese companies froze 
international investments.    
Between 2010 and 2011, according to the authors there was an increase of Outward FDI 
flows, relating it to the signing of the “Memorandum of Agreement with the 
International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank and the European 
Commission, which enabled the granting of a financial rescue program to Portugal, 
several Portuguese companies undertook moves to strengthen their positions abroad to 
improve access to international funding” (Simões & Cartaxo, 2012, p. 2).  
According to the authors, the fact that Portugal has had several social problems due to 
the world economic crisis, in 2008, and to the financial rescue program in 2010, the 
government started to be more focussed on attracting FDI instead of supporting national 
MNEs on foreign investment. This approach could put at risk the Portuguese 
internationalization process. Besides that, the negative climate of Portuguese economy, 
it would impact on MNEs decisions, as most probably they could increase their interest 
on foreign markets as an escape. In this way, Portugal might lose value-added, what 
could lead to a decrease interest on domestic investment.  
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2.3. Portuguese Policy for Outward FDI 
Portugal is a European Union member since 1986. The fundamental principles of the 
European Union are free movement of people, goods, services and capital within the 
Union (European Union, 2012). With no restrictions on capital movement, from this 
period, Portugal has started to encourage local firms to internationalize. Several policies 
were implemented by the Portuguese Government in order to increase firm 
competitiveness, being more significant the results on Outward FDI since 1996.  
From 1996 to 2014, there were seven different Constitutional Governments, with the 
leadership by one of two major parties – PS, or PSD alone or in coalition with CDS.  PS 
(Partido Socialista) has a centre left-wing political orientation, and PSD (Partido Social 
Democrata) a centre right-wing (Lobo, 2006). Despite the different political 
orientations, concerning to Internationalization of Portuguese firms, both parties have 
always in their agenda legislation regarding to foreign investment. The policies 
introduced by the Portuguese Governments were related to financial and fiscal support, 
investment service and network council and direction guides to firm 
internationalization. 
2.3.1 Government programmes for FDI 
 XIII - XIV Constitutional Governments (PS leadership)  
In 1997 based on a government Portuguese policy, a fund to support Portuguese 
enterprises development and foreign market participation
 
was launched
 3
. This fund 
(FIEP) was considered an essential support mechanism for internationalization projects. 
In the next period of Constitutional Government leadership, it was introduced a 
                                                 
 
3
 Resolução de Conselho de Ministros 168/97 de 09 de Outubro de 1997  
FIEP- Fundo Fundo para a Internacionalização das Empresas Portuguesas, S. G. P. S., S. A 
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contractual benefits fiscal programme to internationalization
4
. The main objective of 
this programme was to help firm projects which demonstrate strategic interest for the 
Portuguese internationalization process. 
 XV - XVI Constitutional Governments (PSD leadership)  
Concerning FIEP, the fund was stopped in 2003
5
 when the PSD Government argued 
that the key to the economic development was the national investment and Inward FDI, 
instead of supporting Portuguese companies to invest abroad. During this period, it was 
created an investment Portuguese agency (API)
6
 which principles were to assist bigger 
investment promoters into Portugal, either domestic or foreign ones. 
 XVII - XVIII Constitutional Government (PS leadership)  
In 2006, a national strategic reference programme was introduced (QREN 2007-2013)
7
. 
This agenda was based on incentives to business modernization and internationalization, 
as well as promoting and qualifying Inward FDI. In line with private renovation process 
policy, a public restructuring plan was also implemented (PRACE) which aim was to 
rationalize and modernize the Central Administration services
8
. Based on this objective, 
there were indications by the Ministry of Economy and Innovation to merge API 
(Agência Portuguesa para o Investimento) and ICEP (Instituto do Comércio Externo de 
                                                 
 
4
 Decreto-Lei nº 401/99 de 14 de Outubro de 1999 - Regulamenta o regime de benefícios fiscais 
contratuais, condicionados e temporários, susceptíveis de concessão para a internacionalização das 
empresas portuguesas. 
 
5
 Resolução do Conselho de Ministros nº 71/2003 de 14 de Maio de 2003 
6
 Decreto-Lei nº 225/2002 de 30 de Outubro de 2002 - Cria a (API) Agência Portuguesa para o 
Investimento e aprova os respectivos estatutos  
7
 Resolução de Conselho de Ministros 25/2006 de 10 de Março de 2006 
QREN – Quadro de Referência Estratégico Nacional 2007-2013 
8
 Resolução de Conselho de Ministros 39/2006 de 21 de Abril de 2006 – PRACE Programa de 
Reestruturação da Administração Central do Estado 
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Portugal), former investment and economic promotion agencies, creating AICEP 
Portugal Global which aim is to promote a competitive business environment that can 
stimulate the international expansion of the Portuguese economy
9
. During the 18th 
Constitutional Government, several implementation measures were agreed, concerning 
Portuguese exports increase (Financial Fund, Employment programme, Export Stores 
and Council for the Promotion of Internationalization)
10
. Based on exports OECD data, 
Portugal was a step behind comparing to countries with the same profile, like Austria, 
Belgium, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Sweden. Taking as evidence these 
indicators, the Portuguese Government emphasized the opportunities that the market 
could offer, and the need to implement measures for an economic sustainable 
development and trade balance improvement. Besides that, the creation of 
competitiveness conditions and production capacity needs in order to attract FDI. 
 XIX Constitutional Government (PSD leadership)  
Due to adverse developments in public finances and a deteriorating economic position, 
Portugal has asked on 7 April 2011 for international financial assistance. Following this 
request, the Troika (European Commission, European Central Bank and International 
Monetary) negotiated an Economic Adjustment Programme with the Portuguese 
authorities in May 2011 for the 2011-2014 period “aimed at restoring confidence, 
enabling the return of the economy to sustainable growth, and safeguarding financial 
stability in Portugal, the Euro area and the EU”(European Commission, 2011). 
Following this commitment, a new government took place, changing from PS to a 
coalition of PSD and CDS. In this period, the Council for the Promotion of 
Internationalization created in the previous government, was replaced by the Economy 
Internationalization Strategic Council. The new Council is being chaired by the Prime 
                                                 
 
9
 Decreto-Lei nº 245/2007 de 25 de Junho de 2007 – AICEP Agência para o Investimento e Comércio 
Externo de Portugal, E. P. E.  
10
 Resolução de Conselho de Ministros 115/2009 de 15 de Dezembro de 2009 - estratégia de 
internacionalização da economia  
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Minister with the aim to develop economy with special focus on the exports increase
 11
. 
Following the Europe 2020 Strategy, in 2013 it was launched QREN 2014-2020 a 
national strategic reference programme for that period
12
. The programme is in line with 
the European strategy that is developing the economy, creating employment and 
increasing social welfare. In terms of FDI, the European countries must attract 
investment by increasing competitiveness.   
   
                                                 
 
11
 Resolução do Conselho de Ministros nº 44/2011 de 25 de Outubro de 2011 
12
 Resolução de Conselho de Ministros 33/2013 de 20 de Maio de 2013 
QREN – Quadro de Referência Estratégico Nacional 2014-2020  
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Table 4 - Portuguese Governments between 1995 and 2014 
Constitutional 
Government 
Prime Minister 
Take office 
date 
Party Policy Programme Legislation 
XIII António Guterres 28/10/1995 PS 
FIEP - Fund for 
the Portuguese 
Enterprises 
Internationalization  
Council of 
Ministers 
Resolution 
168/97 
XIV António Guterres 25/10/1999 PS 
Contractual 
Benefits Fiscal 
Programme to 
Internationalization 
Decree-
Law nr. 
401/99 
XV Durão Barroso 06/04/2002 PSD 
API – Investment 
Portuguese Agency  
Decree-
Law nr. 
225/2002 
XVI 
Pedro Santana 
Lopes 
17/07/2004 PSD 
  
XVII José Sócrates 12/03/2005 PS 
QREN 2007-2013 
National Strategic 
Reference Program 
Council of 
Ministers 
Resolution 
25/2006 
AICEP - Trade & 
Investment Agency 
Decree-
Law nr. 
245/2007 
XVIII José Sócrates 26/10/2009 PS 
Financial and 
employment 
support to export 
companies, export 
stores creation, 
Council for the 
Promotion of 
Internationalization 
and inter 
ministerial 
structure  
Council of 
Ministers 
Resolution 
115/2009 
XIX Passos Coelho 21/06/2011 PSD/CDS 
Economy 
Internationalization 
Strategic Council 
Council of 
Ministers 
Resolution 
44/2011 
QREN 2014-2020 
National Strategic 
Reference Program 
Council of 
Ministers 
Resolution 
33/2013 
Source: The author based on Governo de Portugal (2015) 
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From 1996 to 2014, apart from António Guterres leadership, between 1996 and early 
2002, government policies strategy for Portuguese economy in relation to trade, were 
focused on exports promotion and competitiveness improvement, with the priority to 
attract Inward FDI.  
This approach happens following the Euro currency integration period and afterwards 
with the global economic crisis in 2008. Simões and Cartaxo (2012, p. 7) referred that 
“unemployment growth together with the persistence of trade deficits made clear that 
the desired performance and growth for the Portuguese economy would not be 
sustainable without improving the conditions offered by Portugal as a business 
location”. Concerning to Portugal, the attraction of FDI would help to increase exports, 
improving economic growth in the short and long run (Andraz & Rodrigues, 2010).      
Although the policies in the last years have been focused on FDI attraction as well as 
local competiveness and production improvement, it does not mean that Outward FDI 
would not also increase. Andraz and Rodrigues (2010, p. 283) say Portugal is shifting to 
a “specialization pattern towards more sophisticated (high-skill) products, such as 
automotive components, electronics, software and pharmaceutical products, among 
others, which are becoming increasingly more important in the country’s economy”. 
This change is attracting FDI from companies with high value-added products like Auto 
Europa, Vodafone or Embraer. Consequently, local suppliers increase their know-how 
as they need to respond to superior level of commitment. Considering the intensification 
of knowledge need, human capital would get stronger what means Portugal may 
respond better in global market. Moreover,  Simões and Cartaxo (2012) refers the 
environmental policy introduced in previous governments, namely concerning 
renewable energy, had an implicit positive effect on Outward FDI in this field, as the 
experience get in home had developed important capabilities to deal overseas. Either by 
Inward FDI or local market measures, Portugal is getting strong bases to respond in 
foreign countries, influencing Outward FDI.   
2.4. Investigation question and model specification 
In order to identify Portuguese Outward FDI determinants, the empirical strategy is to 
specify and estimate a series of equations which will be analyzed afterwards. I will 
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consider previous analysis on FDI as well as relating it to the Portuguese reality. In 
relation to Portuguese Outward FDI factors, economic determinants will be considered 
– according to the hypotheses presented before - (market dimension and development), 
institutional (political risk, FDI openness and taxes on profits, bilateral investment 
treaties), natural resources, spatial distance and political and country cultures. Like the 
macroeconomic study that focus on the relationship between FDI and political culture 
(Mudambi & Navarra, 2003), in this work  multivariable analyses will be used  on a 
panel data basis in order to analyse the effects on Portuguese Outward FDI.  In order to 
estimate it, the following regression model will be used: 
 
pofdi – Portuguese Outward FDI 
pofdi , ==    + β1hgdppc ,  + β2hgdpag ,  + β3henermtoe ,  + β4htaxperc ,  + 
β5hopenfdi ,  + β6bit ,  + β7hgeodist  + β8hlang  + β9hprisk ,  + β10hhgide ,  + 
β11hhgidec ,  + β12hhgidept ,  +   ,  (2.1.) 
 
The dependent variable is pofdi ,t which refers to the Portuguese Outward FDI stock in 
the host country i in the period (year) t. The independent variables are: hgdppc t,, and  
β2hgdpag , , which are related to the economic determinants for the host country i in the 
period (year) t. With concern to htaxperc t , β5hopenfdi ,  and β9hprisk ,  these variables 
relate to institutional determinants in the host country i in the period (year) t. The 
variable bit t, refers to the fact if exists BIT between Portugal and host country i in the 
period (year) t. In relation to hgeodist t, it indicates the distance between Portugal and 
the host country i in the period (year) t, which is time invariant, this also applies to  
hlang ,  that means the spoken language between Portugal and host country i is the same 
in year t. The political independent variables are hhgide ,  indicates the government 
political orientation in the host country i in the period (year) t ,hhgidec ,  refers to 
identical government political orientation between Portugal and the host country i in the 
period (year) t  and hhgidept  that concerns to the government political orientation in 
Portugal in the period (year) t. Finally,   ,, stands for the error term or residual for the 
country i in the period (year) t.  
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2.4.1 The sample, variables and data sources 
Portuguese Outward FDI stock is the dependent variable and the data come from Bank 
of Portugal data base. Desbordes and Vicard (2009) say that FDI stocks are preferred to 
FDI flows, being less unpredictable, which is important when evaluating yearly data. 
Despite the differences between the BPM5 and BPM6 methods, the report 
“Implementing the latest international standards for compiling foreign direct investment 
statistics” of (OECD, 2014) it refers to studying the nature and motivations of FDI, the 
Assets basis is not the most appropriated, nevertheless, for macroeconomic analysis it is 
preferable. With the implementation of BPM6, several changes were made, and at the 
moment of this study the data for the period between 1996 and 2013 was only available 
in an Assets basis. Nevertheless, for the analysis it will be considered the main countries 
that are recipients of Portuguese Outward FDI, ranging from 60,11% to 87,20% of total 
amount: Angola, Belgium, Brazil, France, Germany, Netherlands, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom and USA. As the study objective is 
to analyse the spatial orientation of Portuguese FDI outwards, in spite of the missing 
data, we have a high statistical percentage available. The Direct Investment Assets 
(Outward FDI) are in Million Euros. 
    
Graph 3 - Portuguese Outward FDI by Countries 1996-2013 
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Source: Own calculations based on Banco de Portugal (2015) 
For the independent variables, I will specify the ones that were used in previous studies 
of FDI determinants, with special focus on the direction of Portuguese Outward FDI 
and government’s political orientation relation. 
One determinant that is largely used in FDI studies, is GDP per capita as market size 
definition (Blonigen & Piger, 2014; Chakrabarti, 2001). The market size is measured by 
the GDP per capita, and data came from the World Bank Development database 
indicator. Markets with larger size are expected to attract FDI, as they indicate more 
opportunities for MNEs. The fact that MNEs exist, is because they look at foreign 
markets as an extent of the local one; MNEs are competing globally, where rivalry is 
very demanding. In order to be successful, MNEs look to improve efficiency by 
producing and distributing in an economy of scale. Additionally S. Globerman et al. 
(2006) says that “larger markets may be associated with agglomeration economies that 
lower costs for all producers in that market”. Considering that, we are in a no boundary 
market and opportunities are associated to larger markets. I expect that GDP per capita 
is positively associated with capital outflows. 
Economies with high GDP growth levels, are referred by S. Globerman et al. (2006) as 
an opportunity to investors. The rapid expansion can contribute to get fast profits, 
meaning that MNEs will look at these markets with special attention. According to 
UNCTAD (2014b) in the World Investment Report of 2014, there are strong indicators 
of FDI in blocks like Africa that it will be increasing in the following years. The need of 
new infrastructures, namely in Mozambique, are signs of economic growth in Africa. 
The historical relation that Portugal has with Africa, namely with Angola and 
Mozambique, may be reasons to have particular awareness of these markets. Following 
S. Globerman et al. (2006) interpretation, concerning to Outward FDI, it is expected to 
have a negative sign if Portuguese GDP growth level is bigger than foreign economies. 
On the contrary, we would have a positive sign. This conclusion is also referred by 
Simões and Cartaxo (2012) for the Portuguese market, taking as sample the Outward 
FDI flows in the period in between 2000 and 2010. The Global Economic Prospects 
Index will be used for this analysis. 
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Natural resources are important for countries with few such assets, namely on Oil. 
Sachs and Warner (2001) referred that there is a relation between GDP and natural 
resource levels, as they called it the curse of natural resources. Countries with low GDP 
level are paradoxically the ones with higher natural resources. Although it is obvious, as 
referred previously, that high GDP levels attracts FDI, it is also true that the dependency 
specifically on oil, makes those countries make investments in these countries. Kolstad 
and Wiig (2012) say there is a positive relation to FDI in such countries. Considering 
that Portugal has a high dependency on fuels and lubricants, having at the end of 2013 a 
negative value of 6.194 Billion Euros in its trade balance (Banco de Portugal, 2014), It 
is expected that host countries with high level of energy production will have a positive 
impact on Outward FDI. Energy production index on International Energy Agency 
production will be the base for this variable analysis.  
Taxes have a strong effect on Outward FDI decisions (Barrios et al., 2012; Grubert & 
Mutti, 1991; Herger, Kotsogiannis, & McCorriston, 2014; Kemsley, 1998; Mutti & 
Grubert, 2004). MNEs evaluate investment decisions taking into consideration various 
aspects, and one that is standard is tax rate. Concerning to corporate taxes, MNEs 
measure its effects, pursuing the best strategy to avoid double taxation, find low tax rate 
countries and evaluate the possibility of repatriating profits to home country. In the case 
of Portugal, Simões and Cartaxo (2012) say that high shares of Outward FDI is to 
locations with special tax and financial advantages. In order to measure taxes impact, I 
will use OECD and national data concerning corporate tax rate. It is expected that 
Outward FDI has a positive relation to countries with lower taxes rate than Portugal.  
It is widely mentioned by economists that consumers gain more with a free market. 
Based on this thought, several measures are being implemented to reduce the 
intervention of governments, looking forward to getting more advantages to consumers. 
WTO, with 160 countries represented (Portugal included), has an important role in the 
world economy concerning the aperture of markets, reducing government 
interventionism. The cut of tariffs is being gradual over the WTO period existence, and 
nowadays we have a more free market. This approach leads to free movement of goods, 
meaning that the effects on import and export will depend on the capacity of MNEs. I 
will consider that tariffs, exports and imports may be associated with openness of 
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market to FDI, meaning Outward FDI will be positive related to its level. UNCTAD 
percentage of world FDI openness data base will be used. 
Although MNEs capability influence the investment level, it is also true that 
governments play an important role as investment facilitators abroad. By signing 
bilateral agreements, it creates useful conditions for business relations, giving 
credibility and decreasing MNEs investment risks. Based on the positive effects 
mentioned, a dummy concerning BIT’s will be used, expecting a positive sign when 
BITs agreements exist. 
The geographical distance between countries may have two kinds of inconvenience, the 
time necessary to move from different points and time zone. Concerning moving, 
nowadays it can be easier travelling to different parts of the world, although it can also 
be expensive. Besides costs, the time wasted on movement is an important factor when 
MNEs choose the place to do investments. With regard to time zone, the differences can 
be a limitation to communication. Drogendijk and Martín Martín (2014) say that a 
larger distance between countries means lower level of Outward FDI. Due to the above 
arguments, is believed that geographical distance may have a negative impact on 
Portuguese Outward FDI. In order to calculate distances, I will use the World Distance 
Calculator available in www.globefeed.com. 
Cultural distance has influence on Outward FDI decisions, being past colonial ties a 
good indicator (Head & Ries, 2008; Mhlanga et al., 2010; Siegel et al., 2013). Portugal 
has a historical past with colonial ties in all continents (e.g. Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, 
India and Mozambique). Mhlanga et al. (2010) relates the influence of colonial ties, 
considering the same language spoken, the variable to measure cultural distance. For 
this analysis, I will use a dummy concerning Portuguese language spoken in host 
countries. It is expected to have a positive sign on Portuguese Outward FDI. 
“Political instability is important to explain variation in financial development around 
the world” (Roe & Siegel, 2011, p. 307). Instability may indicate possible problems for 
MNEs, as the control over its assets can be out of hand. This idea it is also corroborated 
by (Jensen, 2003) saying democratic governments receives 70% of world FDI. In order 
to evaluate the influence of political instability, I will use as variable the political risk 
index of Freedom House. Low risk is expected to increase Portuguese Outward FDI. 
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Critical to my analysis, is the effect that political orientation may have on Portuguese 
Outward FDI. Schneider and Frey (1985) have concluded that political orientation does 
not have high influence on Outward FDI, instead political stability has. Considering the 
period of their study and economy basis, the U.S.A., it is relevant to test nowadays this 
effect. According to (Biresselioglu & Zengin Karaibrahimoglu, 2012; Mudambi & 
Navarra, 2003) parties with right orientation are more market focussed, meaning I may 
have a positive relation to Outward FDI when foreign Government is right wing 
ideology. Besides the ideology in foreign countries, I will check the influence of 
Portuguese Government political orientation in the Portuguese Outward FDI and also 
the effect of the same Political orientations between Portugal and host countries. For 
these variables, I will base my data on countries elections data base. 
 
Table 5 – Variables definition, expected sign and data source 
Variable Definition Expected 
sign 
Data Source 
POFDI 
(dependent 
variable 
International investment position 
Assets Stock Million Euros, annual, 
1996-2014 
 Bank of Portugal  
 
HGDPpc: Host 
Country GDP 
per capita 
Host country GDP per capita 
constant 2005 US$, annual, 1996-
2013 
+ World Bank 
  
HGDPag: Host 
Country Market 
Growth 
Host country GDP % growth, 
annual, 1996-2013 
+ World Bank  
 
HenerMtoe: 
Host Natural 
Resources 
endowment 
Host country M toe of energy 
production, annual, 1996-2013 
+ International Energy 
Agency  
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Htaxperc: Total 
tax rate   
Host country total tax rate (% of 
commercial profits), annual, 1996-
2013  
- OECD and country 
laws       
HopenFDI: 
Host country 
Openness  
Host country Ratio of inward FDI 
stock, annual 1996-2013 
+ UNCTAD Inward FDI 
  
BIT: Bilateral 
Investment  
treaties 
Bilateral Investment  Treaties (1 
Yes; 0 No) 
+ UNCTAD’s BITs 
report  
Hgeodist: 
Geographical 
distance 
Geographical distance between 
Portugal and Host country  
- World Distance 
Calculator available 
in 
www.globefeed.com 
 
HLang:  
Language 
Host country same language + Host country data 
 
Hprisk: 
Political risk 
Host country political risk 
(Lower 1 to Higher 7) 
- Political risk index of 
Freedom House  
HHgide 
Government 
ideology 
Host government ideologies 
(Left Wing 0; Right Wing 1) 
+ Country data and 
international party 
organizations 
            
HHgidec 
Government 
ideology 
Host and home government same 
ideology 
(No 0; Yes 1) 
+ Countries data 
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HHgidept 
Government 
ideology 
Portuguese government ideologies 
(Left Wing 0; Right Wing 1) 
+ Portuguese data 
     
Label: + and – appoint to a positive and negative relationship 
Source: the author  
2.4.2 Variables behaviour descriptive analysis 
For the analysis, 13 countries were chosen and the analysis for the period of 18 years, 
what means 234 observations. Concerning the variable henermtoe, there were values 
missing for the 2013 year. Although we have a strong balanced panel data, in order to 
not reduce the panel data to 221 observations, it was used an interpolation to fulfil these 
missing values. As it is mentioned by (Meijering, 2002) this method has been used 
several times and it is consistent The same method was used for the variable hopenfdi to 
Luxembourg till 2001
13
.  
In order to understand the variables behaviour in the econometric model, it should be 
done a statistical descriptive interpretation. In the Table 6 it is shown the mean, 
minimum, maximum, standard deviations and observation numbers. 
Looking at the table 6 strong differences between countries are visible, what it is 
correlated to the fact that we have countries in different levels of development. This fact 
gives explanation to the standard deviation values.  
                                                 
 
13
 During the analysis I have compared the results with and without interpolation method in order to 
check consistency 
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Table 6 - Variables descriptive analysis 
Description Variable  Observations Mean Min Max Std. Dev. 
Portuguese Direct Investment Assets Flows (Million Euros) pofdi 234 2229.764 22.76 27998.24 3920.205 
Host country GDP per capita (US Dollar) hgdppc 234 35714.29 1130.046 86127.24 18644.71   
Host country GDP growth (%) hgdpag 234 2.726569 -6.370668 22.59305 3.552151   
Host country  energy production (M Toe) HenerMtoe 234 198.3791 .04 1810 437.3948 
Host country total tax rate over commercial profits (%) htaxperc 234 32.48184 12.5 56.8 7.663108 
Host country World ratio inward FDI stock (%) hopenfdi 234 4.590824 0 39.25928 6.734325 
Bilateral Investment  Treaties (1 Yes; 0 No) bit 234 .8418803 0 1 .3656353 
Geographical distance Portugal to Host country  (Kilometres) hgeodist 234 2694.603 493.96 7280.06 2022.729 
Host country same language (1 Yes; 0 No) hlang 234 .1538462 0 1 .3615746 
Host country political risk (1 Low to 6 High) hprisk 234 1.487179 1 6 1.356057 
Host government ideologies (Left Wing 0; Right Wing 1) hhgide 234 .5769231 0 1 .4951065 
Host and home government same ideology (No 0; Yes 1) hhgidec 234 .517094 0 1 .5007789 
Portuguese government ideologies (Left Wing 0; Right Wing 1) hhgidept 234 .3333333 0 1 .472415 
Source: Own calculations on Stata 
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The dependent variable (pofdi) shows high level of difference, which is related to the 
fact that Portugal has a strong relation with the Netherlands and Spain, as it is visible in 
Graph 3. On the contrary, countries like Belgium, Italy and Switzerland have low levels 
of investment. With a minimum value of 22.76 Million Euros and high level of 
27998.24 Million Euros, it leads to a high value of a standard deviation of 3920.205 
Million Euros. The mean value is 2229.764 Million Euros. 
Concerning the independent variable host country GDP per capita (hgdppc), as 
mentioned before, the fact that in the data we have countries with contrasting 
development levels, this value is significantly different between minimum and 
maximum values. For the minimum values we have Angola with 1130.046 US Dollar 
per capita in 1996 and Brazil nearby with 4286.173 US Dollar per capita in the same 
year (developing countries). The country forefront these ones, is Spain with almost 5 
times more GDP per capita 20853.437 US Dollar in 1996. At a higher level is 
Luxembourg with 86127.238 US Dollar in the year of 2007.  The mean is 35714.29 US 
Dollar per capita with standard deviation of 18644.71 US Dollar per capita. Considering 
that Portugal has a GDP per capita of 18214.52 US Dollar in 2013, looking at mean and 
standard deviation, Portugal is framed in the normal statistical curve at a lower level. In 
reverse order, GDP percentage growth (hgdpag) has higher levels in the developing 
countries with maximum value to Angola in 2007 with 22.59% and minimum to Ireland 
in 2009 with a negative growth of -6,371%. The crisis of 2008,  as it is referred by Rose 
and Spiegel (2011), had a very negative impact to developed countries concerning 
growth, on the contrary developing countries did not get such strong influence. 
The variable henermtoe that is related to energy production has a high discrepancy of 
values. This is due to the fact that there are countries with very low resources, like 
Luxembourg with 0.04 Million toe that is the minimum value in contrast with the 
U.S.A. 1810 Million toe. In this variable there is a high discrepancy, as this related with 
the natural resources endowment, which depends on specific country characteristics. 
With a mean of 198.3791, in a panel of 13 countries, only three are above this value (the 
U.S.A., the United Kingdom and Brazil). 
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The minimum value on tax rates (htaxperc) is obtained for Ireland with 12.5; in contrast 
to the maximum that is 56.8 for Germany. The mean value is 32.48184. If a statistical 
analysis was made before and after the year of 2000, the mean value would be higher 
before and lower after this year. 
About the FDI openness (hopenfdi), we have a mean of 4.604335. The minimum value 
is 0.0083122 for Angola. This very low value may be related with the high risks on 
democracy which may give instability. The maximum value is 39.25928 from U.S.A., 
one of the most open countries in the world concerning receiving FDI. Apart from the 
U.S.A., the United Kingdom and France and with very low exceptions of the 
Netherlands and Belgium during some years, all the countries are below the mean.   
Concerning Bilateral Investment Treaties (bit), the medium is very high (0.841) because 
Portugal has investment agreements signed with almost all countries in this study. The 
exceptions are Switzerland and U.S.A., and the case of Angola just in the 1996 year.  
Portugal is part of the European Union which also explains this statistical value.  
The countries more distant from Portugal are Angola and Brazil 5752 kilometres and   
7280 kilometres correspondingly, being the last one the maximum value found in the 
hgeodist variable. Only these countries have Portuguese as national language, what 
justifies the low mean value of hlang variable. The country closer to Portugal is Spain 
with 494 kilometres distance, being this country the second most important concerning 
Outward FDI. All European countries in this study are under the hgeodist variable 
medium value, the other countries are above.  
In relation to the political risk the medium value is low, what means that Portugal has 
relations with democratic countries. All the countries have minimum hprisk value, 1, 
being the exception Angola and Brazil. With concern to Angola the risk is very high, 
having the maximum value to all the years in analysis (6).  
With regard to Government ideology, we have three variables into analysis. The 
variable hhgide indicates that Portugal has relations with a higher relevance to right 
wing ideology (100 vs 134 observations), what is explained by the means of 0.5769231 
and the standard deviation of 0.4951065. Concerning Portuguese Governments 
ideology, during the period into analysis, it was mainly left. The hhgidept variable means 
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is 0.3333333 explained by the 156 left wing and 78 right wing observations. The 
standard deviation of 0.472415 also explains this tendency. Although between Portugal 
and host countries there are differences concerning ideologies, in total, it does not mean 
at the year of governance the same ideology does not match. The variable hhgidec mean 
indicates the same ideology is shared more times than it is not (0.517094), which is 
explained by 121 observations versus 113. 
2.4.3 Correlation analysis between variables 
After the descriptive analysis, it is important to look at the correlation between 
variables. Looking at Table 7 we can see the correlation coefficients, which allow us to 
evaluate how intensive is the relation among determinants is. 
The dependent variable has not a relevant relation with the independent ones. It is 
significant in the case of the GDP growth, taxes on commercial profits, bilateral 
investment treaties and Portuguese Government ideology. It is easy to understand the 
negative variation between the Outward FDI and taxes, and the positive in relation to 
BIT, nevertheless there is a negative impact concerning GDP growth. In relation to 
Government Ideology, just one of the variables has impact, which indicates that a right 
wing party has a positive impact.      
Concerning the independent variables, except common Government ideology between 
Portugal and the host country, and Portuguese Government ideology, they all have a 
high correlation values. One correlation that is very strong is the relation between 
energy production and openness to FDI. This strong value is due to the fact that the 
U.S.A. is the country with very high values in relation with the openness to foreign 
investments and energy production. GDP per capita has a strong negative correlation 
with distance, Portuguese language and political risk. Considering that the most distant 
countries are Angola and Brazil, these countries are also the ones with lower GDP per 
capita and have high political risks. In relation to Government Ideology at host 
countries, right wing ones are related positively with GDP per capita and negatively 
with GDP growth. These results emphasize the consideration made on the descriptive 
analysis, that developed countries have high GDP per capita values and low GDP 
growth, mainly due to the world economic crisis. We may also conclude that European 
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countries are mainly right wing, on the contrary, the Portuguese language and high risk 
political countries are left wing. 
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Table 7 - Variables correlation 
  pofdi hgdppc hgdpag henermtoe htaxperc hopenfdi bit hgeodist  hlang Hprisk hhgide hhgidec hhgidept 
pofdi 1.0000                         
(p-value) ----                         
hgdppc -0.0797 1.0000                       
(p-value) (0.2245)                         
hgdpag -0.1693 -0.2459 1.0000                     
(p-value) (0.0095) (0.0001)                       
henermtoe -0.1070 0.0290 -0.0247 1.0000                   
(p-value) (0.1025) (0.6595) 0.7072                     
htaxperc -0.1568 -0.3044 0.1363 0.2924 1.0000                 
(p-value) (0.0163) (0.0000) (0.0372) (0.0000)                   
hopenfdi -0.0983 0.0912 -0.0787 0.9066 0.2674 1.0000               
(p-value) (0.1337) (0.1643) (0.2306) (0.0000) (0.0000)                 
bit 0.2025 -0.2674 0.0340 -0.6258 0.0484 -0.5654 1.0000             
(p-value) (0.0019) (0.0000) (0.6052) (0.0000) (0.4614) (0.0000)               
hgeodist -0.0645 -0.5558 0.2735 0.4895 0.2334 0.2936 -0.2241 1.0000           
(p-value) (0.3259) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0006)             
hlang 0.0233 -0.7413 0.3945 -0.0660 0.0970 -0.2283 0.1523 0.8073 1.0000         
(p-value) (0.7229) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.3144) (0.1388) (0.0004) (0.0197 ) (0.0000)           
hprisk -0.0438 -0.6392 0.5047 -0.0876 0.1200 -0.2225 0.1128  0.5943 0.8356 1.0000       
(p-value) (0.5046) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.1820) (0.0669) (0.0006) (0.0853 ) (0.0000) (0.0000)         
hhgide 0.0442 0.5015 -0.1738 -0.1483 -0.2357 -0.0529 0.0793 -0.4725  -0.4979 -0.4204 1.0000     
(p-value) (0.5011) (0.0000) (0.0077) (0.0232) (0.0003) (0.4210) (0.2267 ) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)       
hhgidec 0.1028 -0.1395 0.0135 0.0302 -0.0142 0.0529 -0.0438 0.1226 0.1276 0.1141 -0.3429 1.0000   
(p-value) (0.1168) (0.0330) (0.8377) (0.6454) (0.8289) (0.4203) (0.5052 ) (0.0612) (0.0512) (0.0816) (0.0000)     
hhgidept 0.1495 0.0395 -0.1551 0.0032 -0.1676 -0.0237 0.0083  -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0067 0.0917 0.1754 1.0000 
(p-value) (0.0222) (0.5475) (0.0176) (0.9607) (0.0102) (0.7187) (0.8997 ) (1.0000) (1.0000) (0.9188) (0.1618) (0.0072)   
Source: (1) Own calculations on Stata; (2) Shadowed cells indicate significant cases 
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SECTION 3 - Outward FDI in Portugal: empirical 
analysis 
In this section, it will be shown the models econometric results that were built to 
evaluate the impact of the independent variables, with special attention to Government 
ideology, over the Portuguese Outward FDI. Section 3.2 presents the results of the 
Random Effects regression of the base model, and in section 3.3 the base model is 
extended to include country and years. In each case, the regression results are presented 
and discussed. 
3.1. Econometric estimation 
This work has the objective to test the impact of the Government ideology on 
Portuguese Outward FDI. In order to get consistent results, determinants that may 
influence the Portuguese investment on external markets were chosen. As it is shown in 
equation 2.1, it was included in the regression model, variables commonly used as FDI 
determinants - market dimension, economic growth, political risk, FDI openness and 
taxes on profits, bilateral investment treaties, energy production, geography and cultural 
distance - plus political ideology. As the analysis includes observations of different 
individual over a period of time, the analysis will be based on a panel data. In order to 
analyze casual relationships and Ceteris Paribus, multivariate techniques to obtain 
econometric models will be exploited. “Deciding on the list of proper controls is not 
always straightforward, and using different controls can lead to different conclusions 
about a causal relationship” (Wooldridge, 2010, p. 3).  
To choose the best estimation model of the 2.1 equation, the most relevant econometric 
models will be used, which are pooled, fixed and random effects. The analysis is based 
on strongly balanced panel data, as we have for each time period, data available for all 
cross section units (Wooldridge, 2010, p. 250). The pooled model, considering this 
study, should be based on an existence of homogeneity between countries. In order to 
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avoid significant problems due to the countries differences, the error term   ,t is used, 
containing the effects that may affect Portuguese Outward FDI 
14
.  Wooldridge (2010, 
pp. 125, 126) say “if heteroskedasticity is present, more efficient OLS estimation is 
possible”. Before analysing the estimation by OLS, a Breusch & Pagan test was made in 
order to detect that the model has heteroskedasticity. The value was low (0.7885) 
meaning we have the presence of heteroskedasticity. Besides that, due to the fact there 
are variables in different scales, logarithms were used for the Portuguese Outward FDI 
(pofdi), GDP per capita (hgdppc), host country energy production (MToe) and 
geographical distance (hgeodist), which is a common procedure in gravity type 
equations. 
To assess the most consistent model, it was done a Hausman test where the null 
hypothesis was not rejected, meaning that the Random Effects Model is the best option 
(Wooldridge, 2010, p. 291). A Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test for random 
effects test was made to check if Random Effect model is really more consistent to 
OLS. The result was Prob > chibar2 = 0.0000 meaning Random Effects Model is really 
more consistent (Wooldridge, 2010, p. 264).  
Concerning the best model selection, bearing in mind that hgeodist (geographical 
distance) and hlang (language) do not change over the time, if we would like to test 
these variables effect, we may use Random Effects to understand the population 
parameters (Wooldridge, 2010, p. 286).  
3.1.1 Random Effects Model 
The Random Effects Model assumes heterogeneity of individuals and the regression results 
of the base model are reported in Table 8. Looking at these results we conclude that most 
variables are statistically highly significant or significant, with three exceptions: BIT, host 
country Government ideology and same ideology in host and home governments. With 
more than 99% of confidence: market dimension, GDP growth, energy production, FDI 
                                                 
 
14
 This assumption can be evaluated on (Wooldridge, 2010, p. 8) 
51 
 
openness, language, political risk, and Portuguese Government ideology. Additionally, 
with more than 95%:, taxes on profits and geographical distance  
Table 8 - Econonometric estimation results - Random Effects 
 
Description Variables Coef. 
Constant 
 -21.018** 
(8.250) 
Host country GDP per capita (US Dollar) hgdppc 
3.938*** 
(0. 808) 
Host country GDP growth (%) hgdpag 
-0.040*** 
(0. 014) 
Host country  energy production (M Toe) HenerMtoe 
0.500*** 
(0. 160) 
Host country total tax rate over commercial profits (%) htaxperc 
-0.042** 
(0. 020) 
Host country World ratio inward FDI stock (%) hopenfdi 
-0.051*** 
(0. 013) 
Bilateral Investment  Treaties (1 Yes; 0 No) bit 
-0.567 
(0. 412) 
Geographical distance Portugal to Host country  (Kilometres) hgeodist 
-2.033** 
(0.810) 
Host country same language (1 Yes; 0 No) hlang 
9.410*** 
(2.745) 
Host country political risk (1 Low to 6 High) hprisk 
1.206*** 
(0 .205) 
Host government ideologies (Left Wing 0; Right Wing 1) hhgide 
0.382 
(0. 233) 
Host and home government same ideology (No 0; Yes 1) hhgidec 
0.022 
(0. 113) 
Portuguese government ideologies (Left Wing 0; Right Wing 1) hhgidpt 
0.2346*** 
(0. 074) 
Hausman test – Chi2 (p-value)  
6.52 
(0.687) 
N  234 
R
2
  0.6387 
SEE or v σ  0.606 
Rho  .903 
Theta  .923 
Notes: *, ** and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, standard errors are 
in parentheses. Add the option ‘robust’ to control for heteroskedasticity 
Source: Own calculations on Stata 
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Concerning market dimension the result is positive, which corroborates with past 
analysis concerning FDI (Blonigen & Piger, 2014; Buckley et al., 2007; Chakrabarti, 
2001). As mentioned by Blonigen and Piger (2014) high GDP per capita is a factor of 
attractiveness to FDI, being significant to MNEs investment decisions. In this study, 
holding all other variables constant a 1% increase in the GDP per capita in the host 
country raises the Portuguese Outward FDI stock by 3,94%. On contrary, GDP growth 
has a negative relation with Outward FDI, which is different from the previous studies 
mentioned above. Yet this effect is very small, a 1 point % increase in the GDP growth 
rate decreases Outward FDI stock by 0,04%.   
Energy production has a positive impact, meaning that Portugal invests in countries 
with larger amounts of energy production. Due to the fact that Portugal has low energy 
resources, the dependency where oil is included, ought to influence the location of some 
MNEs investments. As mentioned by (Buckley et al., 2007; Kalotay & Sulstarova, 
2010), these resources are key factors to MNEs investment in foreign countries with 
high volume of energy production. This study finds that whenever the host country has 
a 1% energy production increase, the Portuguese FDI stock in that country expands 
0,5%, ceteris paribus.  
Barrios et al. (2012) referred that high taxes on profits have strong negative impact on 
FDI decisions. Furthermore, Grubert and Mutti (1991) say that MNEs tend to decide to 
invest in countries with lower taxes, including moving profits to nations with lower tax 
rates. The Portuguese case is in line with such studies. For an increase in taxes on 
profits by 1% point it will decrease Outward FDI stock in 0,042%, ceteris paribus.  
A country with high levels of FDI openness may attract more foreign investment. In the 
case of Portuguese Outward FDI it is found the opposite. Ceteris paribus, for each 
percentage unit of additional openness in the host country, Portuguese investment in 
that country decreases 0,5%. Görg and Greenaway (2004) refer that FDI openness may 
be related with high level of economic development. In this case most countries in the 
sample have similar levels of development, except Angola and Brazil that in turn attract 
relevant amounts of Portuguese FDI. This is possibly the explanation for such odd 
result. 
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1 kilometer increase on geographic distance between Portugal and host country leads to 
a decrease of 2,03 Million Euros on Portuguese Outward FDI. This result is in line with  
Siegel et al. (2013), as they found that this variable has a high and negative impact on 
investment decisions. 
Mhlanga et al. (2010) have concluded that Portuguese former colonies have been able to 
attract large volume of investments from Portugal. The regression analysis results 
corroborate this conclusion. A host country with Portuguese language means an extra 
9,1 Million Euros of Portuguese outward FDI. 
Political risk, in the case of Portuguese Outward FDI has a positive effect. This is 
contrary to previous conclusions (Feng, 1997; Jensen, 2003). Political risk 1 point rise, 
means there is an increase of 1,2 Million Euros holding all other variables constant. As 
mentioned in Section 2, Angola and Brazil are the countries with higher political risks, 
which suggest that Portuguese MNEs invest in these countries because other relevant 
factors such as historical, cultural and political links may discount their political risks. 
At last, in relation to the Ideology of Governments, a Portuguese right wing 
Government is associated with a positive impact - 234,275 Euros of Portuguese 
Outward FDI. 
This RE model, as mentioned before, is the most adequate to estimate the determinants that 
explain the Portuguese Outward FDI in the base model. The statistical results are mostly in 
line with previous studies, namely market size, natural endowments, taxes on profits, 
geographical distance and cultural similarity. Nevertheless, countries with less openness to 
foreign investment, low GDP growth and high political risks have been able to attract 
Portuguese Outward FDI.  
The Portuguese Outward FDI statistical results are different from (Schneider & Frey, 1985) 
study. As it was mentioned by the authors, Government Ideology was not relevant to the 
U.S.A. Outward FDI but a low political risk was. In this study, political risk is a positive 
cause and right wing Governments at the home country have a positive significant effect, 
which is the opposite to (Schneider & Frey, 1985) conclusion but in line with the 
hypotheses. 
In order to understand the different results of this study to previous ones, the study proceeds 
to analyse the Countries and years effect on the model.   
54 
 
3.1.2 Random effects model – Countries and Years effect 
One advantage of Random Effects is the possibility that time-invariant variables are 
included with explanatory power – this is the case of distance and common language 
variables in the base model. However, it is possible that particular countries and years 
may have an impact into Portuguese Outward FDI. In order to study the effects 
associate with particular Countries and Years two regressions were run that include 
such variables. Table 9 reports the results.  
The Random Effects regression of the base model has an R
2
 of 0.6387, the regression 
with Country variables reveals an improvement to 0.6398 but the regression with both, 
country and time variables, has an explanatory power of 79%. Considering these results, 
is relevant to analyze the Country and Year effects as determinants of Portuguese 
Outward FDI. Table 9, it shows how the dependent variable changes as well Countries 
and Year effect. 
Table 9 – Econometric estimation results - Countries and Years regressions 
Description Variables 
Countries 
Countries & 
Years 
Coef. Coef. 
Constant 
-31.177*** -17.12*** 
(7.752) (3.489) 
Host country GDP per capita (US Dollar) Hgdppc 
4.118*** 1.720*** 
(.974) (0. 432) 
Host country GDP growth (%) Hgdpag 
-0.039*** -0.015 
(0.013) (0. 019) 
Host country  energy production (M Toe) HenerMtoe 
0.398 0.325 
(0.327) (0. 209) 
Host country total tax rate over 
commercial profits (%) 
Htaxperc 
-0.041** 0.004 
(0. 020) (0. 012) 
Host country World ratio inward FDI 
stock (%) 
Hopenfdi 
-0.051*** -0. 018 
(0. 013) (0. 014) 
Bilateral Investment  Treaties (1 Yes; 0 
No) 
Bit 
-0.959** -1.113*** 
(0. 392) (0. 293) 
Geographical distance Portugal to Host 
country  (Kilometres) 
Hgeodist 
0 0 
(omitted) (omitted) 
Host country same language (1 Yes; 0 
No) 
Hlang 
0 0 
(omitted) (omitted) 
Host country political risk (1 Low to 6 Hprisk 1.283*** 1.452*** 
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High) (0. 189) (0. 234) 
Host government ideologies (Left Wing 
0; Right Wing 1) 
Hhgide 
0.373 0.356* 
(0. 238) (0. 192) 
Host and home government same 
ideology (No 0; Yes 1) 
Hhgidec 
0.015 0.018 
(0. 113) (0.057) 
Portuguese government ideologies (Left 
Wing 0; Right Wing 1) 
Hhgidpt 
0.238*** 0 
(0. 079) (omitted) 
Belgium 
 
-7.020** 1.010 
(2.911) (1.702) 
Brazil 
 
1.556** 4.949*** 
(0.617) (1.009) 
France 
 
-5.710** 2.286 
(2.406) (1.644) 
Germany 
 
-5.812** 2.159 
(2.463) (1.647) 
Ireland 
 
-6.187* 3.062 
(3.520) (1.974) 
Italy 
 
-6.306** 1.579 
(2.625) (1.651) 
Luxembourg 
 
-6.792 2.878 
(4.817) (2.419) 
Netherlands 
 
-4.749* 3.959** 
(2.676) (1.750) 
Spain 
 
-2.308 5.077*** 
(2.398) (1.594) 
Switzerland 
 
-10.571*** -1.079 
(3.544) (1.943) 
USA 
 
-8.031*** -0.287 
(2.810) (1.837) 
United Kingdom 
 
-6.464*** 2.102 
(2.395) (1.752) 
Year 1997  
 0. 371* 
 (0. 211) 
Year 1998  
 0. 971*** 
 (0. 245) 
Year 1999  
 1.054*** 
 (0. 286) 
Year 2000   1.489*** 
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 (0. 282) 
Year 2001  
 1.456*** 
 (0. 340) 
Year 2002  
 1.347*** 
 (0. 336) 
Year 2003  
 1.462*** 
 (0. 315) 
Year 2004  
 1.432*** 
 (0. 360) 
Year 2005  
 1.623*** 
 (0. 306) 
Year 2006  
 1.698*** 
 (0.320) 
Year 2007  
 1.697*** 
 (0.373) 
Year 2008  
 1.717*** 
 (0.346) 
Year 2009  
 2.063*** 
 (0.322) 
Year 2010  
 2.288*** 
 (0.286) 
Year 2011  
 2.404*** 
 (0.334) 
Year 2012  
 2.400*** 
 (0.294) 
Year 2013  
 2.390*** 
 (0.318) 
N 234 234 
R
2
 0.6398 0.7961 
SEE or v σ .606 0.474 
Notes: *, ** and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, standard errors are 
in parentheses.  Add the option ‘robust’ to control for heteroskedasticity.  Angola and 1996 naturally 
omitted. 
Source: Own calculations RE regression on Stata 
As expected in these models, the variables hgeodist (geographical distance) and hlang 
(language) are omitted due to collinearity. This is due to the fact that its effects are 
incorporated into Countries’ characteristics. Additionally, hhgidept (Portuguese 
Government ideology) is omitted because this variable is captured by Year variables. 
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Comparing the “countries’ regression” with the base model regression the conclusion is 
that most variables continue to be statistically significant, have the same sign and same 
value for the coefficients. There are two exceptions: (1) the variable “host country 
energy production” becomes non-significant, whereas (2) the variable “bilateral 
investment treaties” becomes statistically significant but with a negative sign. This 
negative result is contrary to earlier studies, where it is mentioned that bilateral 
activities are positive (Zhang et al., 2014). Although the example of (Zhang et al., 2014) 
does not refer to a BIT, but bilateral Government activities, the essence of BIT is there, 
and in the case of Portugal there are treaties with almost all countries in the analysis 
(exception to Switzerland, U.S.A. and Angola in 1996). All country-variables are 
statistically significant except for Spain and Luxembourg, and they also have a negative 
sign except for Brazil that shows a positive impact. These results need a careful reading 
because country-variables do compare with Angola which is omitted but works as a 
benchmark. Thus, a negative sign means that the particular market receives significantly 
less Portuguese investment when compared to Angola, after considering all other 
explanatory factors. Likewise a positive sign means that the particular country receives 
significantly more Portuguese investment. Finally, we highlight that the regression 
confirms the result of the base model that Portuguese government ideology (right-wing 
governments) has a positive impact on the outward FDI.     
Looking at the Country/years’ regression the conclusion is that with few exceptions 
most explanatory variables become non-significant as their impact is now captured 
either by country or years variables. The variables host-country GDPpc and host-
country political risk are significance in all regressions meaning that these effects are 
robust and not captured by Countries and Years variables. As in the “country 
regression” bilateral investment treaties is significant with a negative impact.  Host 
country Government Ideology becomes significant and positive in this model. Not 
considering by now Countries and Year variables, all the others are not significant.  
Comparing the signs of this model to Random Effects base one, the significant variables 
mentioned above still have the same signal. In this model, 1% increase in GDP per 
capita in host country means Portuguese Outward FDI raise by 1,72% maintaining all 
other variables constant, being according to previous studies as mentioned in the 
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Random Effect base model analysis. With the same criteria, Ceteris Paribus, political 
risk 1 point increase means a positive impact on Portuguese Outward FDI of 1.45 
Million Euros. BIT means a negative impact of 1.11 Million Euros.  
As mentioned before, the main objective of this model is to analyse the country and 
year’s effect on Portuguese Outward FDI. Based in the fact there were different 
Governments during the period under analysis in this study (1996-2013), it is important 
to check how Governments affect the Outward FDI decisions. As mentioned before, 
Portuguese Government ideology is absorbed by Years. Based on this and on the 
Random Effects base model results where Portuguese Government ideology impacts 
positively, with high levels of confidence we may say that right wing Governments is 
positive to Portuguese Outward FDI.  
In relation to countries’ effect, Brazil, Netherlands and Spain, with not less than 95% of 
confidence, have a positive impact on Portuguese Outward FDI. Although Brazil is a 
developing country and the most geographic distant considered on this study, the fact 
that they share the same language, cultural and historical links with Portugal suggest 
that past colonial ties have decisive influence, like Mhlanga et al. (2010) concluded. 
Concerning Spain by sharing a common border with Portugal plus sharing a common 
currency within the within the Euro Zone explains the positive impact found. In relation 
to Netherlands, there may be specific country characteristics that affect positively the 
Portuguese capital movements to which tax policy is mostly important. Finally the year-
variables are all statistically significant and positive – in particular from 1997 to 2013 
the coefficient value increases on a regular basis and in most years. This is consistent 
with the trend identified in the Investment Development Path of Portugal studied earlier 
in this study.     
59 
 
 
Conclusion 
Nowadays with globalization markets have become increasingly integrated across the 
world and MNEs take their decisions within this context of greater competition. Due to 
increasing profits need, efficiency and enhanced competitiveness, MNEs expenditures 
are weighted. Depending on market advantages, investments in one country instead of 
another, is a question of opportunity and sustainability.  
Concerning that, Governments may influence positively, creating conditions for MNEs 
to invest locally or outwards. It is being largely studied the positive impact that 
investments have in local economy, as driver to social welfare development and also 
knowledge improvement. Based on this, there is a particular awareness of Governments 
establishing conditions to obtain MNEs investments interest, and also helping local 
MNEs to increase competitiveness in foreign markets, receiving the incursion of 
earnings and experience development by reverse spillovers. But elected Governments 
have different ideas due to Party ideologies, and programmes may differ from a right 
wing Party to a left one. Due to this, it is important to understand if different 
Government Party ideology may influence MNEs investment decisions, particularly 
Outward FDI. 
Despite many studies about FDI determinants, the Governments ideology has not been 
considered. The determinant that is normally included concerning political issues is 
democracy as a proxy to political stability. There is one exception the study by 
(Schneider & Frey, 1985). These authors, besides several other matters, tested Political 
determinants including Government ideology and also political stability. Taking by 
reference the USA Outward FDI, they concluded that Government ideology did not 
have influence, but political stability did.  
From the period of Schneider and Frey (1985) study several changes have occurred in 
the world economy, and the results obtained at that time may differ from nowadays. 
Besides that, the lack of studies concerning this matter is also a good reason to 
investigate the influence that Government ideology may have on Outward FDI. Thus a 
regression model was estimated based on a balanced panel data of Portuguese Outward 
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FDI into 13 countries during the period between 1996 and 2013. Besides the most 
common determinants of outward FDI the model also included three variables related 
with governments’ political orientation: one for the home country, another for the host 
country and finally the third one for identical political orientation between home and 
host countries. Based on the empirical analysis, it was concluded that economic 
determinants (market dimension and growth), institutional (political risk, FDI openness, 
taxes on profits and bilateral investment treaties), natural resources, spatial distance and 
country cultures are important to explain Portuguese Outward FDI as hypothesised. 
However, GDP growth, FDI openness and political risk had an impact opposite to the 
expected one.  
The results achieved show that determinants such as market dimension, language, 
political risk, Portuguese Government ideology and the relations with Brazil, 
Netherlands and Spain are significant. In relation to economic determinants, market 
dimension has a positive high impact. Like Blonigen and Piger (2014) referred, market 
dimension is the main determinant to analyse FDI. With reference to language, 
historical links with ex-colonies do impact on Portuguese investment decisions abroad, 
and are associated with a significant and positive impact of Portuguese idiom. Although 
Brazil is the most distant country included in this study, it was found a very strong and 
positive impact on Portuguese MNEs investment decisions in this country, meaning the 
negative impact of distance and political risk are overcame by the historical links. In the 
case of Spain, having a common border, it may justify the positive and significant result 
found in this study. As for Netherlands, there may be specific advantages to MNEs 
investments, which can be of varied nature, like institutional and/or market advantages. 
Besides these determinants, Political risk and Portuguese Government Ideology are also 
important. In contrast with Schneider and Frey (1985), in this study Government 
ideology has a significant impact but the political risk is positive. Concerning to 
political risk, the result is contrary to several studies, which may be related to specific 
characteristics of Portuguese country relations, namely the investment in Angola and 
Brazil. Although MNEs may not be particularly influenced by Governments, there is in 
the Portuguese case an important relation to political issues. 
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Concerning the impact of Government ideology on Outward FDI it was found a positive 
effect associated with right-wing Governments. Although left wing Parties are 
considered not to be so market oriented as right wing Parties, according to (Vachudova, 
2008, p. 391) “the exigencies of the economy are a better predictor of a party’s 
economic agenda than ideology”. In other words, practical issues may neutralize 
differences otherwise associated with governments’ political orientation. This is not the 
case, as far as we know, this is the first study to present evidence that right-wing 
governments in the home country have a positive impact on Outward FDI.    
Despite our results, the study presents some limitations. The changes on Balance of 
Payments Manual from 5
th
 to 6
th
 edition, lead to lack of information concerning 
Portuguese Outward FDI by country. Although Banco de Portugal provided aggregate 
data, the information by countries was limited and the study only considered the 13 
countries with available data. This influenced the analysis as the panel data was small. 
For future analysis, it is important to have the most complete information with more 
countries, and more years, in order to get wider information. Compared to previous 
studies, the political risk proxy used here was not the best choice. So it is advisable to 
use a wider and most common source to study this matter, in particular to test if the 
result is confirmed, or not.  
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